The Bridge at Rábade - 9th/10th January 1809

This looks at the 'real' history behind yesterdays post "Blow the bridge".

From the 6th to the 8th January 1809 General Moore halted his retreat on Corunna at Lugo and offered battle to Soult, whilst the British regiments recovered something of their discipline and collected many of the stragglers. The French Marshal hesitated to attack, and, on the night of the 8th/9th, Moore, who had no more than one day's supplies remaining in Lugo, resumed the retreat. The army reached Betanzos on the 9th, and on the night of the 11th the main body entered Corunna.

As the army prepared to slip away from under Soult's nose at Lugo Captain Gordon of the 15th Hussars records:

Orders were accordingly given to withdraw the guns as soon as evening closed in sufficiently to mask the movement, and the troops began their march about nine o'clock.

Watchfires were left burning on the ground we had occupied , which were kept up during the night by the picquets, who remained to observe the enemy's motions.

The different columns retired with the utmost regularity, and in such perfect silence that the French did not discover our evasion until after daylight. The night was extremely dark, which favored this manoeuvre.

Out route to the town lay over broken ground and though intricate lanes; the country was also intersected by dry stone walls, enclosing fields and vineyards, which made it difficult to keep the squadrons together, as no man could see his own horse's head, much less his file leader.

Out regiment was destined to form the rearguard as usual, and halted under the walls of Lugo, near the Corunna Gate, at eleven o'clock, to allow time for the infantry, who had not yet come up, to join the line of march.

During this interval the left squadron was ordered to the town-house to take charge of 35,000 dollars, which must otherwise have been left as a prize for the enemy. Sealed bags, each containing 500 dollars, were distributed to the troopers, and in this manner GBP8,000 was saved to the nation; but our poor horses were much oppressed by the addition of nearly two stone to the weight carried.

Some of the columns lost their way, owning to the darkness of the night and the mistakes of the guides, so that it was nearly two o'clock before they got clear of the town.

Some 8 miles north-west of Lugo the main road to Corunna crosses the Rio Miño at the village of Rábade. The bridge is a typically solid stone Spanish structure dating from medieval times.

We followed soon afterwards, and on crossing the Miño found the Engineers employed in mining the bridge. It was natural to suppose that, after so many failures, they had acquired sufficient experience to enable them to accomplish their object, and in this instance success was particularly desirable, as the river was not fordable.  The steam is broad and rapid, the bank rotten, and the neighborhood does not furnish material for making even a temporary repair. The destruction of this bridge was therefore expected to throw considerable impediments in the way of the enemy's advance; but our hopes were again disappointed. The powder exploded, the bridge remained uninjured, and the French crossed the river within a few hours. It is an extraordinary circumstance that our Engineers, who bear such a high character, should have failed so frequently in one of the most simple operations of the science.

However from the French perspective, Le Noble states:
The French entered Lugo on the 9th, where they took 18 pieces of cannon and 100 caisson destined for the army of Romana. Marshal Soult assigned Franceschi's division to the avantgarde and sent him off in pursuit of the English. However the General found that the enemy had blown up a pillar on the bridge at Rabade where the main road crosses the Miño, two leagues from Lugo. Colonel Garbe having under his command the engineers and sappers of the regiment was able to restore the bridge sufficiently during the night (9th/10th) for infantry and cavalry to pass and by the following night it was strong enough to allow the artillery to cross.

Once across the Miño, Franceschi's cavalry pushed on rapidly trying to prevent futher attempts to blow other bridges on the Corunna road:

Our avantgarde arrived in time to stop the destruction of the bridge over the Ladra, and we executed a charge in which five hundred English prisoners were taken.

The cavalry continued to pursue the enemy, the same day, they forced a passage of the bridge over the Mendeo and pushed up Montefalquiero. On this occasion, General Franceschi twice charged the enemy's cavalry, and captured a thousand men, five guns, two of them French, from the time of Louis XIV, many boxes of ammunition and baggage, and among which was the carriage of the general commanding the rearguard.

Blakeney of the 28th (North Gloucestershire) Regiment also noted the losses on the 9th and 10th and the dismal performance of the Royal Engineers:
During the disastrous march from Lugo to Betanzos more men had fallen away from the ranks than during the whole previous part of the campaign. The destruction of several bridges was attempted, but failure was the invariable result.


However not all the skirmishing seems to have involved the rearguard that day, as Blakeney continues:
Directing our attention towards the stragglers as soon as day dawned, we discovered them formed in tolerably good order, resisting the French cavalry and retiring up the road to where we were in position. General Paget saw the whole affair, and perceiving that they were capable of defending themselves, deemed it unnecessary to send them any support ; but he declared in presence of the men, who from a natural impulse wished to move down against the cavalry, that his reason for withholding support was that he would not sacrifice the life of one good soldier who had stuck to his colours to save the whole horde of those drunken marauders who by their disgraceful conduct placed themselves at the mercy of their enemies.

The stragglers by this time became formidable ; and the enemy's cavalry having lost some men, and seeing the reserve strongly posted, declined to follow farther this newly formed levy en masse, who, true to their system, straggled up the hill to our bivouac.

Battle of the Panniers
Blakeney recalls how the action that day between the stragglers and the French came to be known as the Battle of the Panniers amongst the men.

A soldier of the 28th Regiment, really a good man, who had the mule of Doctor Dacres, to whom he was batman, having fallen in the rear because the animal which carried the surgeon's panniers was unable to keep up with the regiment, stopped at the houses mentioned ; and, getting up before daybreak to follow the regiment he was the first to discover the enemy as they advanced rather cautiously, no doubt taking the stragglers for our proper rearguard. The doctor's man shouted to the stragglers to get up and defend themselves against the French cavalry ; bat before they could unite into anything like a compact body, some were sabred or taken. He then gallantly took command of all those who, roused to a sense of danger, contrived a formation, until, to use his own words, he was superseded by a senior officer, a sergeant, who then assumed supreme command ; upon which General Panniers, with his mule, retired up the hill to where the reserve were posted. I understand that the sergeant got a commission for his good conduct among the stragglers ; but the poor batman was neglected a not unusual instance of "Sic vos non vobis" in the British army.


FYI This last action was covered in a previous post as well, the Battle of the Stragglers a scenario for Capitan.

Futher Reading:
A Journal Of A Cavalry Officer In The Corunna Campiagn 1808-1809 - Captain Gordon
Memoires sur Les Operations Militaires Des Francais en galice, en portugal er dan la valee du tage en 1809 - Le Noble
A Boy in the Peninsular War - The services, adventures or Robert Blakeney

The disgrace of the Vistula Lancers Los Yébenes 24 March 1809

This prestigious body of light cavalry was made up of about 1000 men, all of Polish nationality, distributed in four squadrons of two companies, commanded by Colonel J. Konopka. Although the name of Vistula Legion was given to them by the Emperor on the 2nd March 1808, in fact its origins went back to the 8th September 1799 when it was created as the "Regiment of Lancers of the Polish Legion of the Danube", which in 1801 took the name of the "Regiment of Polish Lancers" and in 1807 that of "Lancers of the Italian Polish Legion".

Its showy and unmistakable uniform consisted of trousers and short jacket of turquoise-blue cloth, with yellow collar, facings and lapels and silver-plated buttons. Their helmets were the typical Polish chatska, in this case yellow, and each lancer carried a small arsenal consisting of his lance with red and white guidon, sabre, two pistols and a carbine.

As far as the regiment’s standards went, it continued using the four republican standards of the Polish Legion which it had received in 1800 in Italy from the hands of the then First Consul Napoleon Bonaparte. They had refused to replace them in 1805 with new ones which were in conformity with the new imperial iconography.

The Lancers in Spain

The Lancers entered the Peninsula via Roncesvalles on the 28th May 1808, arriving at Pamplona on the 31st. They left on the 5th June, heading in the direction of Zaragoza with the French punitive column detailed to occupy this city and punish its rebellious inhabitants. En route they overcame the Aragonese successively at Tudela, Mallén and Alagón on the 8th, 13th and 14th of June, and on the 15th were able to gallop into the city of Zaragoza, but were ejected from the city the same day. They then joined the beseiging troops until the 14th August, when they all withdrew in the direction of Navarre. On the 23rd November they fought again at Tudela, and after this victory the bulk of the regiment was transferred towards the centre of the country, leaving before Zaragoza, during its second siege, only a detachment of thirty-three men and horses who were detailed to form Junot’s escort and later Lannes’.

The Disaster of Los Yébenes

On the 20th March 1809 the Lancers left Toledo with the rest of General Sebastiani’s troops en route for the Sierra Morena, and on the afternoon of the 23rd they arrived at the town of Los Yébenes, while the infantry and artillery were near Mora.

That night the sentries heard suspicious sounds and informed the Colonel, "but he calmed all his officers, assuring them that the enemy was several days march from here, near the Guadiana river", but he was mistaken, since facing him and hidden by the fog was the new Army of La Mancha, commanded by Count de Cartaojal, who at seven in the morning mounted an attacking front against the Lancers, who at that moment had just got out of bed.

Lancers of the 5th company engaged their enemies at once. The rest of the regiment was forming in disarrayed squadrons by the church in the center of the village. Suddenly the fog lifted and the Poles caught sight of dense ranks of the Spanish cavalry, and two batteries of horse artillery as well. The Colonel managed to form his men at the entrance to the town, but as soon as he realised his clear numerical inferiority he ordered the withdrawal of the whole regiment by the only road possible, which was a climbing, narrow and winding track which led to Orgaz. Shortly before this the carts and baggage of the Regiment had started to retreat along this road, being unaware that that the Carabineros Reales of the Vizconde de Zolina’s cavalry had been posted on this road, waiting for them.

Their march had hardly begun when the Lancers encountered their own wagons returning in disorder pursued by the Carabineros, and in this situation, attacked at the front and in the rear on a narrow road, the Colonel had his men make a desperate charge.

Soon the lancers, led by Konopka, met two regiments of the Spanish cavalry. Konopka cried: "Forward, boys!" and then the foremost 8th company men leveled their lances attacking furiously. It was the Carabineros Reales, one of the better regiments in the Spanish Army who blocked the narrow road on the edge of a precipice without any chance to go forward or back

It was a merciless fight. Lancers were prevailing with their lances, and carabineers, armed with swords, were – from the very beginning – condemned to defeat. In the terrible melee, where only few soldiers could fight back the attacking Poles, the carabineers, pressed between their attackers and the following Spanish regiment, had no chance. Some hurled themselves in despair into a stony river while others tried to climb the rocky slopes above. Those on the road died.

The lancers' attack completely surprised the Spanish soldiers, who moments before were absolutely sure they would prevail. Now, seeing their front lines smashed by the enemy, they began to move back, and those in last ranks started to retreat. The lancers were pressing, and soon they hewed their way to a wider part of the road. There, separated from the Spanish soldiers, they went into gallop.

Colonel Konopka, along with Major Ruttie and dozen of lancers, left the regiment, which finally reached the open field, and began to form defense lines to repulse the Spanish cavalry, which flowed out from the canyon. The Polish colonel safely reached Mora, where the main forces of General Valance stayed, convinced that the regiment was lost. The regiment however, led by one of the squadrons' COs, Captain Telesfor Kostanecki, fought its way through the enemy's lines, and in a roundabout way – by Consuegra – arrived few hours later in Mora, although without their carts, which were left on the road.

Shortly afterwards General Valence’s Polish infantry arrived from Mora to help him. At the moment both forces met, the following scene took place, which is related by one of its direct participants, the officer Wojciechowski:

"When I jumped off my mount, I took Kazaban to one side and asked him why our Colonel, always so brave and perspicacious in all the previous combats, had completely lost his head today, and was complaining to our General about how our regiment was lost. He did not understand these complaints, because he was sure that the whole regiment was out of danger. Kazaban took a deep breath, took my hand and said to me,

‘You are probably right, and our regiment is out of danger, but nevertheless something worse has happened. We have lost the standard of our regiment, the emblem we received in Italy many years ago during the French revolution. The emblem that Napoleón wanted to change when he became Emperor and the regiment opposed, because it felt so strongly about it: this emblem was our four standards.’

‘What the devil are you telling me?’ I shouted. ‘I am sure that we left them in the depot at Madrid!’

‘Yes’, he said, ‘the covers and the poles have gone, but I put the standards with my own hands, in the greatest secrecy, in a saddlebag that was in the Colonel’s wagon. That wagon was left on the other side of the big mountain and I am sure it has been captured by the Spaniards’.

I was stunned. I knew the consequences of this accident for the whole regiment. In this case our regiment would merely exist, and we Lancers, no matter how brave we might be, would be deprived of all reward or promotion".

Indeed, the Regiment had lost its four standards, which was serious enough in itself, but to make matters worse we had disobeyed a superior order, according to which they should have been left in Madrid in a safe place. As a result of this the Regiment was deprived of the right to receive new standards, even after Albuera (16-V-1811), at which it managed "heroically" to take six British infantry flags in the course of a “legendary" charge.

The Regiment merely existed in this way in Seville, by Imperial decree of the 18th June 1811 serving as base for the new 7th Lancers Regiment (Chevaux-Légers-Lanciers).

In the action at Yebenes the regiment of Polish Lancers suffered significant losses. Lieutenant Stanisław Moszyński (Molzinski) was killed. Captains Jan Szulc and Kajetan Stokowski, as well as Lieutenant Stawierski and surgeon Jan Gryll, all wounded, were taken prisoners (the retreat was so difficult that the regiment could not evacuate its wounded). Overall, between 8 March and 15 April the regiment lost 89 men. Subtracting from that the 47 who were taken prisoner and noting that subsequent losses of the regiments were negligible if any, the remaining number of lost lancers was 42, which was probably the number killed in the clash of Yevenes.

The regiment also lost all of its wagons of the supply train, and along with them all four squadrons' banners, gifts from Napoleon's wife, Joséphine de Beauharnais when the regiment was still in Italy in 1802. The loss of the banners was recognized by lancers as an infamy. They decided - for honour's sake - to wash it away as soon as possible. The lancers' defeat became known all over Spain. It was probably the only defeat from the Spanish forces during all Peninsular War that truly hurt them, and dented their fame. In the nearest future "los infernos picadores" with all their impulsiveness and bravery would try to regain their former reputation among the ranks of the Armée d'Espagne.

Extracted from the Napoleon Series/Wikipedia

Bibliography:
The standards of the Vistula Lancers
Battle of Yevenes
The Peninsular War, Charles Esdaile
Michał Karpowicz, Mirosław Filipiak, Elita jazdy polskiej
Stanisław Kirkor, Legia Nadwiślańska 1808-1814
Marian Kukiel, Dzieje oręża polskiego w epoce napoleońskiej
A History of the Peninsular War 1807-1814, Charles W.C. Oman
Kajetan Wojciechowski, Pamiętniki moje w Hiszpanii, Warszawa 1978
Andrzej Ziółkowski, Pułk jazdy legionowej, Pułk Lansjerów Nadwiślańskich 1799–1815

Roquemaurel and the Chasseurs de Montagne - Part 1

Jean Baptiste Marie Maurice de Roquemaurel St. Cernin was born August 27th 1771 at Chateau de la Tour in the village of St. Sernin, just north of Soueix.

His military career is difficult to summarize, his having been a Lieutenant in the Régiment d'Infanterie du Dauphiné, an officer in the army of Condé, and a second lieutenant in the 2e Hussars with Napoleon in Italy as well as having spells in the service of the English and Austrians all by the age of 32!

However it was on both sides of the Pyrenees where he was to leave his lasting impression, nicknamed "la terreur des espagnols" by the French and "hombre del Demonio" by the Spanish.

In 1803, his father, he was the only son in France, the rest being immigrants in Spain, forced him to resign from the army and return to Soueix, he married and had children, but felt restless being away from military operations and so resumed service in 1808 during the Spanish war. On the advice of Bellouguet, sub-prefect of Saint-Girons, he was appointed Capitaine-Commandant of the company of Hussars de la Garde d'Honneur à Cheval for the district of Saint-Girons.

The Chasseurs de Montagne were raised with the objective of patrolling the Spanish side of the Pyrenees to disperse bands of Catalan's who harassed Marshal Suchet's corps. From 1808 to 1812, Maurice de Roquemaurel served as Capitaine-Commandant, and his many accomplishments, his audacity, and resolution, earned him the nickname in Ariège "le brave Roquemaurel". The Prefect of Ariège in 1810 wrote: "He is endowed with great military skill and bravery that have been particularly noted by Count Suchet, commanding general of 3e Army Corps in Spain. The missions which he had led and his conduct earned him the Knight's Cross of the Légion d'Honneur".

Indeed, having quickly learned the tactics of guerrilla warfare, itself fast, mobile, persistent, the Spanish war would bring him lasting glory: he is involved in several actions including a dangerous night attack, where at two o'clock in the morning at the head of four companies of the Chasseurs de Montagne he leads a bayonet charge to open a passage through the Spanish lines, saving Colonel Lapeyrolerie troops who had found themselves surrounded in the l'Isavena valley, and earned him the admiration of Suchet.

But his finest achievement was the capture of Fort Venasque, the Spanish bastion of High Aragon : Suchet's staff estimated that 10,000 men were needed to carry the place however on November 21st, 1809 Roquemaurel with his troop of 300 'Ariégeois' Chasseurs de Montagne, crossed the Sagoun glacier during the night, and surprised the outposts, capturing the town and fort.

Suchet's memoirs record:
Captain Roquemaurel was sent there with the battalion of 64e and the Chasseurs d'Ariege, he forced the positions in the valley, entered the city, and summoned the fort, the garrison, intimidated by people, forced the Governor to open its doors. This advantage gave us a new communication route with France, and allowed us to disarm the valleys of Vénasque, Gistain and Bielsa, an ammunition dump in a nearby convent on the border of Catalogne was discovered and destroyed.

He went on to distinguish himself at the siege of Lleida, then in the conquest of the Val d’Aran, where he spent two years, constructing the fort of Sainte-Croix, and organizing the defenses to prevent the movement of the Catalan guerrillas and the incursions of the terrible Mina. His valour, and his exploits made him the terror of the Spanish border.

To be continued (1812 and the operations in the Ariège valley)

Bibliography:
Le Colonel Maurice de Roquemaurel, défenseur de la vallée de l’Ariège contre les Espagnols en 1812 - P.Peyral
Grands notables du premier Empire - Louis Bergès et Michel Cours-Mach
Branche de Saint-Cernin, issue de la branche de Montégut

Related Post:
See The Chasseurs de Montagne bring honour to their name a Capitan scenario which covers the action at Venasque.

See History and Uniformology of the Chasseurs de Montagne

The 'Black Hussars' in action 15th August 1813

After the defeat of Prussia in 1806, the Duchy of Brunswick was dissolved. The Field Marshal, Karl, Duke of Brunswick, overall commander of the Prussian Army was killed at the battle of Auerstadt. His son, Friedrich Wilhelm, fled to Austria.

With the outbreak of war between France and Austria in 1809, Friedrich organized a "Free-Corps" for the Austrian Army. The force consisted of one regiment of Infantry and one of Hussars. Their uniforms earned them the nickname of the "Black Horde". By July Austria was knocked out of the war and an armistice was at Znaim on 12th July, Friedrich didn't feel himself bound by this and he decided to fight his way out to the North German coast and thence to England. Remarkably he succeeded and after some fierce fighting he sailed for England on the 6th August

The Brunswick Hussars were formed as part of the reorganisation of the 'Black Horde' in England following their 'escape' from Germany and were subsequently sent to Spain in 1813.

Since the summer of 1812, an 8,000-strong Anglo-Sicilian force, joined by about 6,000 Spanish troops from Minorca, occupied the port of Alicante on the east coast of Spain. The army frequently changed generals but did nothing to contribute to the Anglo-Allied war effort. In February 1813, Sir John Murray was appointed to command the now 18,000-man force made up of
7,000 British and KGL troops, 3,000 Sicilians and Italians, with two Spanish divisions totalling 8,000 men, and was to conduct a series of amphibious operations along the Spanish coast.

After defeating Suchet at Castalla in April, Murray was ordered to move by sea to capture the port of Tarragona. By this maneuver, Wellington intended to distract Suchet from his summer 'Vittoria' Campaign. Murray landed on June 2nd, the raid, initially very successful, was badly managed by a timid Murray and developed into a farce, with a disgracefully and unnecessarily hurried withdrawal of the force back on to its ships in which many cannon were abandoned and for which Sir John Murray was later court-martialed. He was relieved of command on June 18th.

The Brunswick Hussars, two squadrons strong, totaling 18 Officers and 258 troopers landed at Alicante, direct from England, in February 1813. Along with two squadrons of the 20th Light Dragoons they formed the cavalry brigade under Lord F. Bentinck and took part in many of the actions under Murray.

Sir John Murray was replaced by Lieutenant General W. Bentinck and by August 1813 they were once again back besieging Tarragona.

As Lord W. Bentinck reports:
On the 3rd the Duke del Parque's corps came up to Tarragona; as did the division of General Sarsfield on the 11th. General Elio could not spare the three regiments of the division of Migares, which I had requested him to send me.

0n the 10th I heard that Marshal Suchet had returned to Villa Franca from Barcelona, and had brought with him five thousand men. The reports of the succeeding days, left no doubt of it being his intention to move forward; and on the 14th, I learned from the Baron d'Esoles and Colonel Manzo, that besides collecting all he could from the garrisons, he had been joined by Decaen with six thousand men.

In consequence of this intelligence, I suspended all operations for the siege of Tarragona, except the making of fascines, and landed neither artillery nor stores.

There was no position on the Gaya, as I had in my former letter supposed. There are only two carriageable roads across it, but they are at a distance of ten miles from each other. The river having no water in it, and being only impassable from the steepness of its banks, is passable for infantry every where. A corps placed in the centre could not reach either flank in time to prevent the passage of the enemy. General Whittingham, whom I had sent with his corps to the Cols of San Christina and Llebra, reported them not to be defensible, with so small a force as we could allot to this object.

I had intended to have pushed on to the Llebregat. Suchet's army was at one time divided between Barcelona and Villa Franca, and its environs. A rapid movement might possibly have enabled me to fall separately upon his advanced corps, and to obtain possession of the ridge of mountains on this side the Llobregat before he could have time to bring up his troops from Barcelona. I could not execute this movement before being joined by Sarsfield, and previously Suchet had concentrated his force in Villa Franca and it's neighbourhood. Suchet's force has been variously reported, from twenty to twenty-five thousand men.

The immediate vicinity of Tarragona offered a very good position in itself, but it may be completely turned by an enemy who, crossing the Cols, should approach Tarragona by Valls and Reus.

On the 14th Suchet moved a large corps upon Alta Fulla, but the road being close to the beach, the gun-boats prevented him from passing, if such were his intention.

On the 15th he drove back the posts on the Cols of San Christina and Llebra, and afterwards forced the corps at Brafia, by which they were supported, to retire.


Colonel Lord F. Bentinck had been ordered to observe the force crossing the Cols in the direction of Valls on the 15th and he reports on the actions of that day:
In obedience to your directions, I marched yesterday afternoon, with the brigade of cavalry under my command, beyond Nulles and Villabella, and reconnoitered the enemy's column, which was advancing upon Valls.

As soon as we began to retire, the enemy followed us both with cavalry and infantry, and a squadron of the 4th Hussars pressed closely upon our rear-guard, formed by Captain Wullfen's troop of the Brunswick Hussars, and attempted to charge and overpower it.

The enemy was opposed each time with determined spirit and resolution; and Captain Erichcson, with his troop, being sent to the support of Captain Wulffen, the enemy were driven back, with the loss of one officer killed, another officer wounded, and between twenty and thirty men left sabred on the field. Sixteen prisoners and eleven horses fell into our hands.

I had sincere pleasure in observing the spirit displayed by tbe officers and men of the Brunswick Hussars. Lieutenant-Colonel Schrader, at all times zealous, was particularly useful on this occasion in restraining the impetuosity of his men. Circumstanced as we were, with a strong column of the enemy far advanced upon our right flank, and two battalions of infantry (as I was informed by the prisoners) upon our left and rear, and in an enclosed country, I did not deem it prudent to pursue the advantage we had gained. I regret to say that Cornet Redant, of the Brunswick Hussars, was wounded and taken, and I subjoin a return of the remainder of the wounded and missing.


Bentinck reported wounded and missing as:
Brunswick Hussars
6 privates wounded, 6 privates missing, 4 horses killed, 2 horses wounded, 2 horses missing.
20th Light Dragoons
2 privates, 2 horses missing.
Total loss: 1 officer, 13 privates, 16 horses.



With Suchet's continuing to advance towards Tarragona, Lord W. Bentinck abandoned the siege and retired on Cambrills.

Bibliography:
The Black Brunswickers - Osprey MAA-007 Otto Von Pivka
History of the Peninsular War Southey Vol VI p253
The European Magazine, and London Review, Volume 64 By Philological Society (Great Britain) p349
The Gentleman's Magazine, Volume 114 By John Nichols
The Gentleman's magazine, Volume 83, Part 2
Royal military panorama, or, Officers' companion, Volume 3
Cobbett's political register, Volume 24
A History of the Brtish Army - Volume IX 1813-1814 By J W Fortescue, Sir
My thanks to Steven H. Smith, Digby Smith and Ron McGuigan!

Action at Bruc 6th June 1808

The burning of the papers

Background
The situation created by an insurrection in the city of Lleida on 28th May 1808 concerned both the French and Spanish authorities in Barcelona and so on the 1st June 1808 Jose de Ezpeleta, Captain General of Catalonia, was dispatched with the Reg. d'Infanteria de Línia 'Extremadura' to restore order in Lleida, whilst at the same time Antonio Garcia Conde was sent with the 1/2nd 'Reales Guardias Españolas' and a squadron of the Reg. de Cavalleria de Línia 'Borbon' to Villafranca del Penedès for the same purpose. The next day the two companies of Reg. d'Infanteria suïssa nº 1 "Wimpfen" in Barcelona were sent to Tarragona to rejoin their regiment.

On Thursday 2nd June of 1808, a popular revolt began in Manresa, led by the local Governor Francisco Quince, sparked by the burning of official papers sent by the central authorties in Barcelona. In Lleida a local Junta was formed to govern and defend the city, headed by Bishop Jeroni Maria de Tores with the ultimate goal being to drive the French army out of Spain. The Extremadura Regiment never reached Lleida, and at Tarrega they decided to join the military insurrection. On the 4th Vic also revolted followed by Cardona on the 5th.

In the face of this revolt General Duhesme, then commanding the Corps of Observation of the Eastern Pyrenees, feared that his lines of communication back to France might be cut at any moment, with the towns of Roses, Girona and Hostalric all occupied by Spanish forces of very questionable loyalty to the central government in Madrid, and whom he believed were about to join the insurrection. His problems were exacerbated by the receipt of a number of confusing and conflicting orders. The first a written order from Berthier to send Chabrán's Division to Saragossa to cooperate with Marshal Moncey, the second a verbal order from Berthier to send the division instead to Valencia to cooperate with Moncey and the third from Murat to send Chabrán's Division along with the 3e Provisional Cuirassiers to occupy Tortosa, half way between Saragossa and Valencia, where they were to remain and only if they failed to occupy Tortosa were they to fall back to Valencia to join up with Moncey.

General Duhesme resolved these conflicting orders by deciding to send two columns, one under General Chabrán consisting of 5 battalions of the Brigade Goullus with the 3e Provisional Cuirassiers to Valencia via Tarragona, Tortosa and Nules, and the second under the orders of General François Xavier de Schwarz with one battalon 2e Regiment d'Infanterie de ligne Suisse, two battalions 1e Régiment d’Infanterie de ligne Neapolitan, one battalion d'Infanterie de lígne Italienne, one squadron 3e Provisioanl Cuirassier, one squadrons of 2e Chasseurs a Cheval Neapolitàn, and one section of the 11e compagnie d’Artillerie a Pied Italienne (2 pieces of 4lbr) to Saraggosa via Igualada, Manresa, Cervera and Lleida.

The order issued by Duhesme to the generals was:
"The Generals Chabrán and Schwartz will leave tomorrow, the 4th June, commanding the two flying columns, the make up of these two columns is indicated in the margin. General de Division Chabrán, with the Generals Goullus and Bessières under his orders, commands the first column of 4,000 infantry and 200 cavalry with their corresponding artillery. They will go to Tarragona which they will occupy, leaving a garrison of a thousand men. Incorporate in to the division the regiment swiss Wimpffen giving orders to it colonel as necessary including threats of using force in case of resistance to this by its officers. Continuing to march by Tortosa to Valencia arriving on the 22nd. At Nules open the attached paper where you will find instructions concerning the combined operations with the Marshal Moncey who will be found that day near that city with a corps of 10,000 men.

General Schwartz will go via Molins de Rei and Martorell to Manresa with the second column of 3,800 men of all arms. In that city impose a levy of 750,000 francs payable within 48hrs and which will serve to meet the expenses of the division. He will act to punish the leaders of the rebellion, but forgive them, claiming the mercy of the Emperor. At the same time destroy the gunpowder mills sending the existing stock to Barcelona, protected by a detachment of 100 cavalry as far as Esparreguera where they will be relieved and return to their division.

The division will immediately leave by Cervera for Lleida in front of said city make several demonstrations. In case of seizing the city leave a garrison of 500 men. Incorporate in to the divison the detachment of swiss and impose a levy of 600,000 francs. Wasting no time move on Saragossa. In Bujaraloz open the attached paper where you will find details of the combined operations with General Lefebvre who you will find on the 19th, and no later, at Saragossa. The levy from Lerida will be made available to the General."

On the 4th the two columns left Barcelona, the first in the direction of Tarragona and the second towards Lleida. Although these orders were supposed to be a secret, the threat to the towns of Manresa and Igualada was evidently so widely known that by that afternoon news of the columns departure had already reached those towns and a general call to arms was issued by the somatenes. At the same time the new authorities of Igualada sent Antonio Franch and Joseph de Olzinelles to Vilafranca del Penedes to ask the local governor, John de Toda to supply then with weapons.


The Somatenes and Migueletes were traditional Catalan defence organizations. The professional army having all but disappeared after Duhesme's troops had taken Barcelona, the "Corregimental" (local) Juntas and the Catalan High Junta (constituted formally at Lerida on 18th June 1808), promoted the formation of Miguelete Tercios and a general Somatén. Throughout the war, both forms of grouping were adopted by the military themselves, and their actions often overlapped with those of the guerrilla groups.

The migueletes were really a paramilitary militia, mercenary and voluntary in nature, recruited by the local authorities or war juntas with the aim of carrying out special actions or of reinforcing regular troops. Unlike the somatenes, which only operated close to their respective towns and villages, the migueletes were mobile and independent and had a hierarchy similar to that of the army. In practice, migueletes and somatenes are often confused with traditional forms of military organisation.

Somatenes on the heights above Bruch

First Action at Bruc (see detailed map at end)
Schwartz arrived at Martorell on the 5th, he remained there for the whole day due to a violent rain storm which allowed time for the somatenes of Manresa and Igualda to organise. A group of about 100 Igualada somatenes under the command of Juan and Jaime Llimona and Antonio Franch y Estalella, armed with a mixture of axes and muskets, left Igualada for Bruc de Dalt, together with a detachment of 24 men of the Reg. d'infanteria suïssa nº 1 "Wimpfen" permanently stationed in Igualada, led by Lieutenant Don Franz Krutter Grotz. They were joined by a similar sized group of somatenes from Manresa led by Francisco Riera, Maurico Carrio and Augurio Parera y Soler (a distinguished Capitan of the somatenes in the war against the French in 1793) and a group of Reales Guardias Valonas, deserters from the Barcelona garrison under the command of Sergeant Major Don Justo de Bèrriz and Capitán Don Carlos Vicente. The Igualada group cut the Camino Royale near Can Solà de la Roca a kilometer west of the Can Macana junction, whilst the Manresa group cut the Can Macana road somewhere above the junction, a further abattis was thrown across the road at Caseta Peones just east of the junction.


On the morning of the 6th, General Schwartz with his troops quit Martorell, leaving behind a half dozens riders to maintain communication with Barcelona, but had to stop again for a few hours at Collbató because of further heavy rain storms, reaching the village of Bruc de Dalt just around 11:00am.

Beyond Bruc de Dalt, the famous pass of del Bruch, which public works have today converted into a pleasant and picturesque landscape, was at the time a wild land of ridges, rough ground, rocks, ravines, thickets and thick pine forests. About 2 Km beyond Bruch de Alt just before the junction of the Carretera de Igualada with the Camino de Manresa, at the point that is today the Caseta Peones, the road makes a turn forming a natural amphitheater, whose bottom was inaccessible and the slopes were an impenetrable pine forest with rocky massifs on the top. This formed a narrow gorge through which, the column would have to pass and in those pine forests the somatenes hid waiting to surprise their opponents.

The French column was advancing from Collbató preceded by a small avantgarde, made up of 3e Provisional Cuirassiers, oblivious to any possible danger. As they approached Bruch de Baix, near the Pou del Glac, they received musket fire from 8 somatenes in the house of D. Emilio Pascual, these were actually the first shots fired against the French. Schwartz then deployed the right wing of his troops, which crossed over the torrente to 'old' Bruch on the other side and continued to advance parallel to the main column as far as the middle of Bruch, sacking the village as they went, however seeing that there was no further resistance he pulled the right wing back across the torrente at the place called 'el juego de trucos' and the column continued up the road, in to Bruch De Dalt, and then to the plain at Pla de la Cova just beyond Bruch de Dalt which they reached at around 11:00am.

The Cuirassiers, who had continued their march without any scouts to alert them to any possible surprises, in spite of the 'reminder' they had been given at Pou del Glac, entered the gorge about a kilometer ahead of the main body. Suddenly the Cuirassiers were brought to a halt by a barricade that had been thrown across the road, at the same moment they received a devastating fusillade from the direction of the forest to their right, where the somatenes had lain in ambush, that played along the whole length of the cavalry column. Momentarily confused by the ambush, the thick forest making it difficult to see the quantity or quality of their attackers, and unable to deploy in the narrow pass, many Cuirassiers were cut down before they turned and fled back towards the main body of the column (The cavalry were to lose 60 men during the day, with 30 horses being delivered by the somatenes to Lleida after the battle).

General Schwartz reacted quickly, the column was halted and again the 2e Suisse battalion was ordered up, and preceded by a cloud of skirmishers, he launched them in a strong attack column against the somatenes in the pass. The somatenes under pressure from the French, who were superior both in numbers and arms gave way, with the majority, retreating up the Can Masana towards Manresa whilst a smaller group retreated towards Igualada and the barricade at Can Solà de la Roca. The French chased the larger group of somatenes for 1.5km as far as the Casa Masana which lay at the junction of the Manresa and Montserrat roads, seizing that building before finally calling a halt.

Casa Masana

At 12:00pm believing the danger had now passed, Schwartz gave orders to his now halted column to prepare food for the troops, leaving the avantgarde at the Casa Masana, with the main body of the column still just beyond Bruch De Dalt at Pla de la Cova.

The battle was however, far from over, the somatenes from Manresa as they withdrew met another group of about 200 somatenes just arriving from the direction of Manresa consisting of a unit of about a 100 men under the command of Captain José Viñas from Sampedor and another of 60 men from Sallent led by their Vicar, Ramon Mas, and 40 others from the area of Bages, all good shots, and encouraged by these reinforcements, the somatenes decided to return to the positions now held by the French.

The Casa Masana had become the rallying point for the head of the column after the pursuit was called off, as with the main body the troops had halted for lunch and with the somatenes in full retreat towards Manresa no further trouble had been anticipated. The French position at this point was actually quite precarious, over 3km separated the head of the column from the main body, they were not visible to each other and with the somatenes able to use the mountain paths of the Montserrat to move around safely and unnoticed they could cut the road at any point they liked between Cassa Massana and Pla de la Cova.

About 1:00pm the returning somatenes surprised the French outposts and drove them back, the building was attacked from all sides and the route back down the Camino was threatened, after a firefight the building was taken and the French retreated back down the hill in some disorder, those that didn't manage to escape were either killed or surrendered there.

As the French retreated down the Can Masana pursued by the somatenes, another group moved down the paths along the Montserrat back down towards the junction and the Pla de al Cova. Schwartz seeing the Catalans now approaching from all directions formed up the column in a large square and slowly fell back to a farm close to Bruch de Alt. The constant ringing of the all church bells in the vicinity worried Schwartz, who feared that he could now be facing a general uprising, according to legend the sound of drums echoing in the mountains also convinced Schwartz that the "Extremedura" Infantry Regiment was approaching and with minute by minute the fire of the Somatens becoming heavier and more effective Schwartz took the decision to abandon his mission and fall back to Barcelona. The retreat was initially unhurried and in good order but as they sound of battle reached the various hamlets and villages the numbers of somatenes grew steadily.

At about 5:00pm, just below Bruch de Baix, the column reached Pla del Alzinar, a flat open area between Bruch de Baix and Collbató, Schwarz felt that here he would be able to make effective use of his superiority in numbers and drive the somatenes off, so he turned to face them and for two hours engaged in a firefight but with little result. The somatenes continued to make effective use of their knowledge of the local terrain to be able to fire at the French whilst exposing themselves to little danger, so with a lively fire showing no signs of abating Schwartz was forced to resume the retreat but the hour was now getting late.

They eventually reached Esparraguera around 10:00pm still in good order, they tried to fortify the place so that they could defend themselves in anticipation of support from Barcelona. However they discovered that the village's main road which runs for a kilometer was blocked by a barricade made of furniture, carts, beams and all sorts of objects and led by Pedro Morrall, the people were at the windows, on rooftops, in the corners, ready to fight. The avantegarde suffered heavy losses as it tried to make it's way into the village forcing General Schwartz to divide his force into two columns and bypass the village on either side.

About 1.5 kilometers outside Esparraguera the river Abrera, normally little more than a dry river bed but now in full flood due to the heavy rains, is spanned by a small wooden bridge. A group of somatenes commanded by the Vicar of Olesa, Juan Boada had attmepted to destroy the bridge by setting fire to it but this was only partially successful and around 1:00am the column proceeded to cross. However at some point whilst the column was crossing the bridge collapsed and in the confusion in the dark many were killed or wounded, one of the two guns was either thrown into the river bed or left stranded on the wrong side of the river along with some ammunition cassions, a lot of time was spent in trying to recover the gun but it was eventually decided to abandon it as order completely broke down in the column and still under fire from the somatenes they fled.

The Spaniards continued to harass the retreating French all the way to the gates of Martorell which were reached at about 4:00am, the French didn't halt there but continued their flight to San Feliu de Llobregat, located a few kilometer's from Barcelona, where they arrived on the morning of June 7th, 1808 in a pitiful condition. French losses were put at 320 dead, 600 wounded whilst for the Catalans a mere 20 dead and 80 wounded.


Aftermath
It was a major psychological victory, the first defeat Napoleon's army suffered in the Peninsular, before Bailén, and was to become a symbol repeatedly exploited by the civil and military authorities in their anti-French propaganda campaign. From the point of view of organising their defence, following the Bruc battle, other villages which had previously not raised somatenes, like Vilanova and la Geltrú quickly did so.

Knowledge of the local terrain, particularly in the hills, enabled the somatenes and migueletes
to cause the French army heavy losses. With the aid of the local population, the Catalan patriots carried out a defensive war of attrition, accepting no real battle unless they had clear numerical superiority. The ability of the Catalans to mobilise in the countryside and in the defence of towns under siege was noted by French Oficers from the start.

The first Catalan somatén was formed in early June 1808. Citizens of Igualada, Manresa and other neighbouring towns raised a somatén in the Bruc mountains with the aim of halting General Schwartz's march. The skirmish, which took place on June 6, had the desired effect and succeeded in putting the French Imperial troops to flight. Beyond legend and the myth of the "Drum of Bruc", the participation of the Swiss Wimpffen regiment in the action should be noted, with the detachment commanded by Lieutenant Francisco Krutter preparing an ambush for the French, as well as that of other regular troops, many of them deserters from Barcelona. Their participation was also decisive in the second action at Bruc on June 14th, led by Joan Baget, a scribe from Lleida, in which besides the Manresa and Igualada somatenes there was participation by the Cervera and Lleida tercios, among which there were several Swiss companies, more than 500 men, dressed as peasants, even down to their Catalan barretina caps.

Order of Battle

French (3,800 men)
General de Brigade Schwartz
2e Regiment d'Infanterie Suisse(1 bn) Colonel Castella de Berlens 580 men
1e reg. d'Infanterie de lígne Neapolitàn (2 bns) Colonel Pegot 1,944 men
1e reg. Italian Royal Velites (1 bn) 519 men
3e reg. Provisional Cuirassiers (1 esq.) 200 men
Artillery: 1 section 11e Cie. Italienne 2 canons de 4 lbs 85 men
Train d'Artillerie de la Garde Italienne 59 men

The Catalan OB is fairly vague, the figure widely quoted is up to 2,000 by the end of the action but right or wrong it is difficult to see how such an estimate could ever have been made. At least 500 were involved during the initial fighting around Buch and as time went on more joined the fight but the action had no overall control, groups or individuals simply turned up and got involved, all you needed was a man with musket and knowledge of the terrain. Over the years politics has also heavily impacted the OB with various towns wishing to play up there own participation or to down play or play up depending on the point of view the involvement of regular spanish units in the action.

Catalan (start 250; end 2,000 men)
Detachment permanent d’Igualada del Regiment Suís núm. 1 "Wimpffen" (24)
   Tinent don Franz Krutter Grotz
Detachment del 2n. batalló de "Reales Guardias Valonas"
   Sergent major don Justo de Bèrriz i capità don Carlos Vicente
Sometens d'Igualada (100)
   Antoni Franch, Josep d'Olzinelles, Joan i Jaume Llimona
Sometens de Manresa (100)
   Maurici Carrió, Francesc Riera i Augurí Parera i Soler
Sometens de Sampedor (100)
   Josep Viñas
Sometens de Sallent (63)
   Mossèn Ramon Mas
Other somatens or volunteers - Barges (40) Bruc (22)

Notes:
El Timbaler del Bruc
The most famous of the 'myths of Bruch' is El Timbaler del Bruc, according to legend a drummer boy from Sampedro, rejected by the somatens as too young to serve, marched to Bruc and the sound of his drum echoing in the mountains convinced the French that a large regular force was approaching and caused them to retreat to Barcelona. The reality is this legend didn't arise until some time after the battle, and Laffaille states it was the sound of the church bells not the drums that worried Schwartz. However it is not inconceivable that there might have been a localised effect at some point and there were two drummers on the battlefield.
Armour piercing bullets
One explanation for the devastating effectiveness of the first volleys on the Cuirassiers, according to legend, is that the somatenes due to lack of resources had to make their musket balls out of iron and this enabled them to penetrate the 'armour' of the Cuirassiers.

Detailed Map of Action at Bruc:
The attached map is dated 1949 which predates all of the major road works that have significantly changed the battlefield topography, although clearly there have been some changes between 1808 and 1949 you will find that the basic topography is the same. Click the image below to display the full size image, please note this image is very large and the file size is over 7Mb, the original was over 35Mb so this is the best I can do. This map will be useful if you wish to stage a refight of the action at Bruc.

To be continued in 'Second Action at Bruc 14th June 1808'


Bibliography:
Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia, Tomo 44 (1904), pp.333-351.
Popular resistence in catalonia: somatenes and migueletes in the French War: Antonio Moliner Prada
Cercle Català d'Història
Primeres Accions Armade
Forces emfrontades en la Guerra del Frances (1808-1814) 2.- l’Exercit Imperial a Catalunya
Forces emfrontades en la Guerra del Frances (1808-1814) 3.- l'Exercit Espanyol
Miqelets a la Guerra del Frances (1808-1814)
La Acciost del Bruch en ï8o8.
Les Batalles del Bruc
La nación falsificada By Jesús Laínz
Les Batailles de la « Guerra de La Independencia » vues par les Espagnols (3)
Historia del levantamiento , guerra y revolución de España Libro Cuarto
Primera batalla del Bruc
Segona batalla del Bruc
Primer Combate del Bruch (6 de junio de 1808)
BIBLIOGRAFÍA SELECCIONADA SOBRE LA GUERRA DE LA INDEPENDCIA
Mémoires sur la campagne du corps d'armée des Pyrénées-Orientales - G. Laffaille
Journal des opérations de l'armée de Catalogne, en 1808 et 1809
Guerra de la independencia, historia militar de España de 1808 á 1814 Tome II José Gómez de Arteche y Moro
A History Of The Peninsular War Volume 1 Oman
Maps

Retreat from Toulouse 12th April 1814

The Battle for Toulose in April 1814 marked the last act of a war that had raged for almost seven years between the French and British, first in the Peninsula and finally in France itself, with the rearguard action at Baziege being it's final curtain call.

In 1813 the demoralized and defeated French army was forced out of Spain by Wellington, with Marshal Soult driven across the Basque countryside to enter France reaching Toulouse, whilst Marshal Suchet withdrew from Barcelona and Catalonia falling back on Narbonne.

Toulouse lies on the Garonne, which runs into the city from the southwest, then turns and exits to the northwest. Just east of the Garonne, the smaller l'Ers River runs past the city from the southeast to the northeast. The Languedoc Canal extending from the Garonne covers the city to the north before turning south forming a narrow corridor between the Garonne and l'Ers.

Attacking the city from the north, Wellington's main force crossed to the east bank of the Garonne, then drove southeast down the corridor between the two rivers with Beresford on the extreme left thrown forward to take the heights of Calvinet and turn the French right flank, leaving Hill on the west bank to attack the suburb of St Cyprien as a diversion.

When Marshal Soult decided to make a stand against Wellington at Toulouse he was well aware of the weakness of his army and knew he was no longer strong enough to beat Wellington alone but he could give him a bloody nose whilst making him work hard for the prize of Toulouse before withdrawing to join up with Suchet at Narbonne, with Wellington's army weakened by losses and the need to garrison Toulose and conversely Soult strengthened by the forces of Suchet it was possible that Wellington could then be defeated and driven out of France. For Soult's plan to work though he needed to make sure that he didn't get shut up in Toulouse by Wellington and he had expressed his concern about finding himself needing to fight his way out of Toulouse particularly if the British managed to seize Baziège which sat astride his line of retreat.

A hard fought battle on the 10th saw Beresford capture the heights of Calvinet and pushed Soult back into the city, though he still managed to hold on during the 11th. However by that evening with only the road to Carcassonee still open, enemy cavalry were discovered pushing southeast towards Baziège intent on cutting his line of retreat, it was apparent now that he couldn't afford a moments delay if he was to avoid being trapped in Toulouse and he decided to start his withdrawal immediately to effect a junction with Suchet who was still at Narbonne.

It was however no easy task to disengage his force in the face of an aggressive enemy like Wellington. Soult would need to somehow extricate himself from his positions in Toulose without alerting Wellington, move via the Carcassonee road with his flanks protected by the river on the one hand and the canal on the other then crossing both the Languedoc Canal and l'Ers River at Baziège destroying all the bridges across the river and the canal south of Toulouse before the British cavalry moved down from the heights around Baziège.

If he was to complete this task successfully and without further loss he would need to carefully organise the withdrawal and so Soult issued very extensive and meticulous orders to his troops for the night of the 11th/12th. Although quite long these orders as given make a fascinating study and reveal a remarkable flexibility in the command structure of the Napoleonic French army.

The order for withdrawal
The army was to commence it's withdrawal at 9:00pm on the 11th and head along the main road to Castelnaudary via Villefranche, which it was to occupy, and where new orders would be given it.

General Soult's cavalry were to assemble at nightfall and move to Baziège, where it would immediately place outposts on the town walls, the right bank of the l'Ers, and between that river and canal to watch for enemy forces and to cover the various routes that lead to Baziège. It was ordered to wait, at Baziège, until the army had passed, or until it was given new orders to continue it's movement.

Soult left a cavalry regiment between Rangueil and Castanet to guard the course of the canal, particularly the bridges that were destroyed or barricaded. This regiment was to join the rear guard as it passed and take the orders of Generale Comte Reille.

Comte d'Erlon was ordered to start the 2e Division at 9:00pm on the dot, and he was to give orders to his division to take up a position at Baziège, guarding the route of town walls and all the crossings that were on the l'Ers and the canal, until the whole army has passed, then his division would be joined by the 1e division under Comte Reille, and Comte d'Erlon was then to take charge of the rear guard on leaving Baziège, the cavalry necessary for this purpose would be made available to him.

General Clausel was instructed to order the 4e division to leave immediately after the 2e division, and to follow it's movement and form a second line to the 2e division, behind Baziège, until the arrival of the 5e division, when Comte Reille would give them orders and they would resume their march, but in the meantime, the 4e division would comply with the any orders it receives, if necessary, from Comte d'Erlon.

The army artillery park was to leave as soon as the 4e Division had marched, and follow it's movement; when it reached the highway, it was to march as far as possible, in two files, in order to reduce it's depth. General Tirlet was to ensure that his officers and noncommissioned officers of artillery and the train were distributed along the column to ensure it ran in order and to prevent any gaps from forming.

The Train was to follow immediately after the Artillery, they would also move in two files and observe the highest order. The Gendarmerie a pied, under the command of Colonel Thouvenot, were to be distributed along the column of the train and artillery park to make sure they marched in order and was to be prepared to contribute to it's defense if necessary.

After passing Baziège, the artillery and train would head the column to Villefranche, where they would receive new orders.

General Travot was to start the reserve division immediately after the park and train, and follow them to Villefranche. It would also track their progress, and if the column were to halt, it was ordered to immediately find the reason for it and make sure it resumed the march as quickly as possible.

General Clausel was occupy all the positions along the line, from Porte-Neuve and Saint-Etienne to Pont des Demoiselles inclusive, until the 1e and 5e Divisions had passed and were formed wholly on the main road and then he was to start the 6e and 8e divisions, they were to follow the movement of the reserve division, and head to Villefranche, where they would receive further orders.

Generale Comte Reille was to evacuate the brigade of 5e Division and all the artillery that was currently occupying the suburb of Saint-Cyprien, when he judged that the movement of the army was well advanced, so that it would not need to wait too long on the grande esplanade. At the same time he was instructed to send orders to General Darricau to join him on the promenade, with the 1e division. When the junction was made, and all the army had passed, Comte Reille was to start his two divisions and form the rearguard. To this end, he was to have at his disposal the cavalry regiment that General Soult had left between Rangueil and Castanet. He would also have the squadron of Gendarmerie a cheval that General Buquct was to leave under his command, after leaving the suburb of Saint-Michel. Finally, he would be joined on the heights of Saint-Aigne by the brigade of General Rouget, whom he was to send orders to to proceed overnight to this destination.

The posts General Clause had occupied along the Garonne in Toulouse were to be recalled.

The running order for the army, after Baziège, and up to Castelnaudary was to be as follows:
The Artillery park;
The Train;
The reserve division, under General Travot;
The divisions of the left wing, commanded by General Clausel;
The divisions of the right wing, under command of Generale Comte Reille ;
The divisions of the center, forming the rearguard, commanded by Generale Comte d'Erlon;

The cavalry was to be part of the rearguard or would be used at points where required, according to the orders it receives.

After Baziège each General was to resume control of the divisions that formed part of his command.

All divisions, even the reserve, were instructed to take with them their artillery batteries, which must be completed to 8 guns each, and the rest of the field artillery, which would not be used by the divisions, would form a reserve battery and march with the park.

General Tirlet was instructed to take everything that belonged to the artillery at the place and the school.

Colonel Michaux, commander of the engineers, was to take a company of sapeurs and a company of miners with the tools of engineers and leave with the 2e division for Baziège and at the canal, complete the destruction of the bridges and open up new communications as necessary. He was to leave at the disposal of the Comte Reille another pioneer company for the destruction of bridges and the establishment of barriers that could stop the movement of the enemy. This company was to follow the orders of Comte Erlon, when he took over the command of the rearguard after Baziege.

General Travot was instructed to order the Garde-Nationale of Toulose to take over control of all gates and canal bridges, and the suburb of Saint-Cyprien during the night. He was also to instruct the Chefs de Legion and cohorts, on their honor and responsibility, to stand firm in these positions, during the following the day, until the enemy were present in such superior numbers that they were compelled to surrender. In this regard, the lieutenants were to each send a staff officer to General Travot to act as couriers carrying any orders that they were given to their destinations, taking care to ensure that there would be no interruption at all to this service. General Travot could if he wished, to increase the apparent strength of his posts, employ individuals of the city guard who were not armed, because in such cases their appearance alone might be suffecient to impress the enemy.

The l'Ordonnateur en Chef (chief officer of the department) was instructed to use the evening to load as much supplies as possible on to the canal to then be taken back to Castelnaudary and Carcassonne, but if, against all odds, they were unable to make it they should be dumped into the canal.

Soult advised the lieutenants that they should personally take in hand these movements to ensure that they occur in the strictest order and complete silence, and that no one was to be left behind, even wounded, and during the night nothing was to happen in the batteries.

As can be seen when necessary to ensure the movements of the army were coordinated the commander would give very specific and detailed orders, normal command structures were bypassed and a more ad hoc structure was used more like battle-groups as Soult endeavored to ensure that the army managed to slip away under the nose of Wellington. Once they were at a safe distant then the normal structure would resume.


The withdrawal
Soult reported on the night of the 12th from Villefranche:
Yesterday evening the enemy had pushed the head of a column of cavalry up as far as Bastide de Beauvoir (LaBastide-Beauvoir) and St. Martin des Champs (St. Martin-Boulogne), with his outposts occupying the heights at Baziège.

His plan was obviously to cut my communication with Castelnaudary, and shut me in Toulouse. Therefore at 9:00pm, I set the army on the march, the movement took place in the greatest order and by 8:00am in the morning it had entirely crossed the bridges over the l'Ers and the Languedoc canal near Baziège.

The ten squadrons of enemy cavalry hadn't yet appeared, but in the afternoon the heads of several columns of infantry and a large number of cavalry with supporting guns, moved down from Bastide, Mont-Laur and also by the highway, and along the right bank of the canal.

A small engagement took place, which cost us 25 chasseurs of the 10e Regiment.

The enemy has established it's advanced guard in front of our positions at Ville-Nouvelle. He holds Montesquieu, and we have seen large movements of cavalry. My advance guard is at Mount-Gaillard and Saint-Rome, and the rest of the army is between Villefranche and Avignonet. Tomorrow, I'll occupy positions in front of Castelnaudary, and it is likely the rearguard will be involved in several actions.

I had to leave 900 sick or injured troops in Toulouse that couldnt be moved. The amputees and those whose recovery is uncertain are in the hospital, others were divided among the inhabitants, and I have no doubt they will take the utmost care of them. I can not praise too highly the conduct of the inhabitants of Toulouse and the city guard and the dedication that I witnessed, and the attentions that they gave to our wounded, give the highest honor to this important city.

I had to leave behind in Toulouse three pieces of 24, one piece 16, two mortars and two 8-inch howitzers, belonging to the school that we did not have time to evacuate, those guns are now unusable. Besides the weapons, ammunition, and all that was capable of transport has been released.

A group of 300 to 400 enemy cavalry appeared yesterday between Caraman and Auriac, they pushed up as far as Cabanial on the road to Revel, a detachment of 25 Gendarmes, commanded by an officer who were in search of deserters and also looking for supplies, has unfortunately been caught and have lost part of the unit. I do not know yet exactly how many Gendarmes have returned, but to date we only know of four or five. This detachment of cavalry has not yet appeared in Revel by 8:00am today, but it was expected there, as they had requested that supplies be prepared for them. I can only regret being unable to prevent these incursions.

The reports I have received from Montauban are from 10:00pm, General Loverdo tells me that the bridgehead is in a state of defense, and that he has blocked the entrances to the city. The enemy detachments of cavalry have not yet appeared on the left bank of the Tarn.

An enemy column was reported to be marching through Arriege, I do not think it is strong, but the means of resistance are low in this area, General Laffitte will rejoin tomorrow in Mirepoix.

I have not heard any news of Suchet, or a response to the proposals that I have made to him.


The British troops entered Toulouse at around 8:00am on the 12th. Despite the strong words of defiance from the city during the battle the British were greeted now with shouts of joy and cheers, enthusiasm for Napoleon was clearly waning, and everywhere the insignia of the old bourbon monarchy appeared.

Two roads lead southeast out of Toulouse across the plains of Bas-Languedoc. One, by Saint-Agne, Castanet and Mount-Giscard, follows the left side of the valley Lauraguais, the other by Montaudran and Labège along the right side of the same valley. Both meet at Baziège. Taking the first of these directions, Soult had taken care to cut all the connecting roads and communications, blowing up all bridges crossing the canal at Madron, Castanet, Pompertuzat, Se Donneville and Mont-Giscard around 4:00am as they departed.

At dawn the cavalry of Stappleton-Cotton had been observed at Labege on the opposite bank of the canal and 10:00pm almost all the cavalry under the orders of Major Edward Somerset were seen moving down the valley towards Baziege. At about the same time on the main highway infantry appeared, primarily that of Rowland Hill.

Sir Rowland Hill, after having crossed the Pont de Neuf that connects the suburb of Sainte Cyprine with the town, hastily chased after the French at the head of almost 20,000 men down the rues des Couteliers, de la Dalbade and de la Fonderie leaving via the gate of Saint Michel and marching in the direction of Villefranche slowing only when they reached the rearguard of the French army which had retired in the best order.

Between Rangueil and Ramonville the main highway southeast to Carcassonee is squeezed between the heights and the waterways. In this space between the road and the canal Soult had placed his light cavalry under his brother Pierre Soult to block the advance. General Reille moved to a position on the heights above overlooking the road with two divisions, alarming Hill who was unable to deploy on such a narrow front nor could move by any other route, and threatening to attack his flank from behind the ridge line that extends to his right as he advanced.

Hill suddenly seeing the French rearguard halted with artillery deployed in their front, slowed. Although he wasn't facing more than 6,000 French troops he didn't know if the Marshal was there, ready to punish those who would boldly pursue him. Hill immediately called for reinforcements from his commander-in-chief, who dispatched two divisions to support him.

Only when the reinforcements finally reached him, did Sir Rowland Hill manage to turn the position. For it's demonstration, through his skillful maneuvers, Reille had contained the British for a few hours, and that was all that the Marshal had hoped for. The six thousand men Reille commanded then resumed their march, they reached Baziège around 4:00pm, and found it occupied by the two divisions of the center commanded by Darricau and Darmagnac. The left wing had already marched to the small town of Avignonet, where Soult had established his headquarters.

Action at Baziège
Wellington gave the order for Beresford to move on Bastide and forward to Baziège and for General Stappleton Cotton to cut the road to Villefranche there. The cavalry brigade of Colonel Arentschild advanced on Baziège whilst the 5th Dragoon Guards, commanded by Brigadier Ponsonby, moved on to the heights above Baziège in support, they were joined by Sir Stappleton Cotton with one troop of the 1st KGL Hussars.

About 4km north east of Baziege, the plain between the Chateau de Lamothe and the Chapelle de Sainte Colombe slopes gently to a stream of Visenc it is ideal ground for cavalry. The rest of the 1st KGL Hussars led by Captain Poten were on the LaBastide road that descends into the plain of Sainte Colombe. The French 10e Chasseurs a Cheval of Colonel Houssin de Saint-Laurent who had been supporting Darmagnac's 2e division part of the rearguard under Comte Erlon were marching in column of division as they withdrew in the afternoon.

Captain Poten, having first ascertained that he had only cavalry to deal with, ventured to charge the column with his single half squadron. The two leading divisions were overthrown, and crowding back upon the rear in confusion, the whole hurried on in retreat; Poten followed to the village of Ville Nouvelle, about two miles distant, where some infantry appearing in support of the enemy, he withdrew; but twenty-seven captured men and twenty-five horses, bore testimony to his daring attack. In this short but fierce action Britsh losses at Baziege were around a couple of dozen men.

In the late afternoon the British cavalry pushed on from Bastide to Toutens and Caraman.

In the gentle countryside of Sainte Colombe there is a small cemetery, a somewhat overgrown rectangle divided by an avenue of cypress trees, this is the last resting place of the dozens of British soldiers who fell on April 12th, 1814.

The Armistice
That evening, Wellington received news from Frederick Ponsonby of Napoleon's abdication. A few hours later, this was confirmed when the official couriers arrived from Paris. The next day Soult was notified and a formal armistice was signed on the 17th. The war was over at last.

Bibliogrpahy:
Considérations militaires sur les Mémoires du maréchal Suchet et sur la bataille de Toulouse
Histoire générale de Languedoc, composée par deux religieux bénédictins de la congrégation de S. Maur
Journal des sciences militaires
Mémoire sur la campagne de l'armée française dite des Pyrénées, en 1813 et 1814
Revue des Pyrénées, Volume 16
The London Gazette
History of the King's German legion By North Ludlow Beamish
Baziege-La-rude-bataille

Battle of the Göhrde - 16th September 1813

The battle of the Göhrde was a battle of the War of the Sixth Coalition on 16 September 1813 between Napoleonic and Coalition troops at Göhrde in north west Germany. The Napoleonic troops were defeated and withdrew to Hamburg.

Background
Although still officially in a period of armistice, Napoleon wrote Davout on 5th August outlining his plan for a new campaign. The initial objective was Berlin. Davout’s role was to strike east with his field army in support of Marshal Nicolas-Charles Oudinot, who would be attacking north towards Berlin with four corps totaling 60,000 men. The purpose would be to protect the left flank of Oudinot’s army and to crush Bernadotte’s Swedish corps between them. At this time, Davout’s forces were opposed only by a relatively small Allied force (25,000) of mixed nationalities under General Ludwig Wallmoden.

The 13th Corps, advanced as far as Schwerin by the 23rd August. Davout established his headquarters in Schwerin, and there the 13th Corps remained, conducting reconnaissance patrols, but not moving forward.

On 2 September, Davout received word that Oudinot had been defeated 20 miles outside Berlin on August 23rd at Gross Beern and was retreating. Davout immediately fell back to a line along the Stecknitz Canal between Lauenburg and Ratzeburg to cover Hamburg.

Davout XIII Corps held the Lauenburg - Ratzeburg – Lübeck line along the Stecknitz Canal from 4th September until 13th November. The newly-arrived and newly-promoted Général de division Marc Pecheux took over the 50th Division, and Vichery was shifted over to the 40th Division.

Skirmishing with elements of Wallmoden’s corps continued through September all along the front, while elements of the Allied corps crossed to the left bank of the Elbe and began to attack the outposts that guarded Davout’s line of communications between Hamburg and Magdeburg. In an attempt to protect this line, Davout decided to send a detachment under General Pecheux across the Elbe with orders to clear the area to Magdeburg.

By an intercepted letter found on the person of a French artillery officer, who was taken prisoner near Mölln on the 12th, Wallmoden learnt of Davout plan. No time was, therefore, to be lost, and Wallmoden made the whole of the troops under his orders break up from Hagenow and Wittenburg the same night, and march for Dömitz on the Elbe, 30km east of Gohrde, where a pontoon bridge was already prepared.

The reference in the intercepted letter was confirmed by a notification which, it was ascertained, had been received by the authorities on the left bank of the river, directing preparations to be made for the reception of a corps of ten thousand men, and it further appeared that the object of this movement was to clear the neighbourhood of Magdeburg of the allied troops. A tempting opportunity was thus offered to Wallmoden to strike a blow; but it was not unattended with considerable risk; for the greater part of his troops would be thus removed from their line of defence, brought across a great river, and placed several marches from the point of passing, as well as from the rest of the corps, which meantime, would have to observe an enemy far superior in force. These were serious considerations, and such as, under other circumstances would, perhaps, have been sufficient to deter the general from risking the expedition; but encouraged by the timid and irresolute conduct of his opponent during the preceding operations, he felt that he was justified in making the attempt.

Leaving, therefore, the Swedish division, and about six thousand of the new levies, with a regiment of Cossacks and two guns to observe the enemy’s line on the Stecknitz, he assembled at Dömitz a force of some 15,000 men:

With this force Wallmoden passed the Elbe by the pontoon bridge at Dömitz on the night of the 14th and encamped the following day near Dannenberg. The advanced-guard under Tettenborn was pushed on to the Göhrde forest, beyond which, at Dahlenburg half way between Gohrde and Lunenburg, one hundred Cossacks were posted.

Pecheux with 3,500 men, one squadron of Chasseurs and eight guns, had crossed the Elbe at Zollenspieker on the day previous, and advancing through Luneburg to Dahlenburg they drove in the Cossacks, and occupied the Göhrde with their advance guard. The main body encamped behind the forest and near the village of Oldendorf, where a piece of table land, separated from the forest by deep ravines and similarly secured on the flanks, offered an excellent position.

Calculating that the enemy would continue in march on the 16th, Wallmoden closed up the main body of his corps to the vanguard at about five miles from the Göhrde and so placed it that, covered by the inequalities of the ground, he could attack the enemy in march before they were aware of his presence. The advance guard of Cossacks remained in front to mask this manoeuvre; and to cover the retreat two battalions and three squadrons were left in Dannenberg.

Two Alternative Maps of the battle

Battle of the Göhrde
The Cossacks were driven into Metzingen, half-way towards the position of Wallmoden's main body, on the morning of the 16th, but noon had arrived without any further movement on the part of the enemy. This led Wallmoden to fear that the French General was either about to retreat, or contemplated involving the allied troops in protracted manoeuvres on the left bank of the Elbe; he, therefore, took the opinion of his general officers upon the most advisable course to pursue, and, it being decided that the allies should fall upon the enemy without delay, chose a plan for a simultaneous assault upon the enemy’s flanks, rear and centre in three columns.

Left Column:
Six battalions and one regiment of cavalry of the Russian German Legion, together with captain Kuhlmann’s battery of horse artillery of the King’s German Legion were to march under General von Arentschildt through the left side of the forest, taking the roads by Rieberau and Röthen, and moving upon the enemy’s left flank and rear.

Center Column:
Consisting of Tettenborn’s Cossacks, the main part of the artillery, the Jagers and Lutzow Freikorps, the Hanoverian infantry under General Lyon, advancing by the high Lüneburg road, were to fall upon his front.

Right Column:
The remainder of the cavalry under General Dörnberg, with captain Sympher’s battery of artillery and the English rockets, were to flank the attack on the right.

The troops under Arentschildt having to make a great detour before they could arrive at the point of attack, were put in march at twelve o’clock, and one hour afterwards, the columns of Dörnberg and Lyon began to advance on the right and centre.

Just at the moment when the advance-guard of the centre column had commenced skirmishing with the Pecheux’s light troops in the forest, the sound of cannon fire was heard to come from the other side of the Elbe, in the neighbourhood of Boitzenburg, plainly denoting an attack of the French in that quarter. Wallmoden, however, did not allow himself to be embarrassed by the difficulties to which this movement might naturally have been expected to give rise, but directed the light troops of Lützow and Reiche to press forward into the forest, while Tettenborn’s Cossacks advanced on their flank. The French retired, skirmishing, and covered by repeated charges of their chasseuers, upon the main body, at the Steinke Hill the strong position of which only now became fully apparent to the allied commander.

In front was a deep marsh, which stretching towards the Elbe and Bleckede, was lost in a hollow intersected with clefts and trees. The village of Lüben was before their left, and that of Oldendorf in front of their right wing; the troops were drawn out in line upon the table land behind these villages, having their artillery in front, and no sooner did the advance of the allies appear than a heavy fire was opened upon them.

Tettenborn replied from four guns, with which Captain Wiering’s battery, sent forward by General Lyon, soon united its fire, though at this point it was still largely ineffective. However the attack by the Freikorps infantry and cavalry on the French main position was repulsed with terrible losses, Major von Lutzow himself was wounded seriously.

About half an hour later Arentschildt, leading his columns from the forest, brought his artillery also into action, finally around 4 o'clock Arentschildt arrived in front of Oldendorf, though it was to be another hour before  Wallmoden ordered a coordinated attack by all his troops, as all the artillery was brought up.

The French surprised at seeing a large body of infantry where they only expected light troops, began to make immediate dispositions for retreat; the absence of their General, however, who was in front with his advanced posts, delayed these movements, and he had scarce arrived, when the allies commenced the attack. He however remained remarkably cool and calmly issued his orders. So far he was doing well, his artillery was effective in supporting his defensive position and the Chasseurs-a-Cheval although small in number were very active repeatedly charging from behind the Steinke Hill, particularly towards Luben and Dornberg's cavalry, his losses were small, only a single gun had been lost to the Freikorps. Even when a charge by the 3rd Hanoverian Hussars finally managed to break into his main position the overall situation was still little changed.

Around 5:30pm Arentschildt’s infantry charging with the bayonet on the left, gained possession of the village of Oldendorf and then took Eichdorf at 6:00pm with a single battalion though quickly supported by horse artillery, while the cavalry of Dörnberg on the right assailed the opposite flank. Arentschildt’s battalions met with a fierce resistance, and nearly one hundred of his brave followers were killed and wounded; but the French column had been shaken by the charge, and bringing up his regiment of hussars, they, in a most gallant assault, completed the defeat of the opposing mass.

Dreading now the onset of Dörnberg’s cavalry on the left, the French formed their columns into squares, and commenced a well ordered retreat, pouring a murderous fire from each square, as it successively fell back. General Pécheux accepting now that he would not be able to hold his position had decided to retreat to the north over Eichdorf and Breese the only route left open to him.

The fire of the horse artillery and rockets was brought to bear upon the French, but it had produced little effect, when the 3rd Hussars of the King’s German Legion were ordered to charge. Led on by Major Küper, the hussars rode boldly forward against the square which was in advance; but a hollow way not visible at a distance, appeared, on a nearer approach, to run in front of the square, and the squadrons, being unable to pass it, failed in the intended attack, while Captain von Beila and several men and horses were wounded by the enemy’s fire.

Moving, however, round the left flank of the enemy, three squadrons of the hussars formed in front of one of the rear squares, which they charged with distinguished gallantry and complete success, but experienced the loss of captain von Hugo, and cornet Bremer killed, and Captains von Both and Heise wounded, besides many men and horses. The remaining squadrons now broke a third square, and a bold soldier of the fifth squadron, named Heymann, seizing the enemy'’ General Milozinsky, dragged him, with the aid of sergeant Wedemeyer from the midst of the disordered troops. (Corporals Duntemann and Schaper, as well as hussars Stenzig and Schwan were also conspicuous for their gallantry in the attack on the enemy’s squares.)

Meantime the square against which the first attack of the hussars had failed, was charged by the infantry brigade of Lieutenant-Colonel Hugh Halkett, consisting of the battalions of Lauenburg, Langrehr, and Bennigsen, which falling fiercely upon the enemy with the bayonet, forced them to give way, and the hussars pressed after the fugitives.

The French continued to form again in the rear, and they maintained an obstinate resistance in retreat, until the repeated charges of the allies, and the destructive fire of their artillery and rockets, spread such terror through the retiring ranks, that order could no longer be preserved, and breaking, they fled in all directions.

This general disorder soon communicated itself to the troops which had been placed to cover their retreat, and the pursuit having been pushed on to Nahrendorf, the enemy found themselves cut off from the road to Dahlenburg, and obliged to retire by Bleckede, their general, stripped of his horses and baggage, saving himself on foot. About half past seven in the evening, Wallmoden committed the pursuit to the Cossacks and drew back the remainder of the troops to the Göhrde castle, where they encamped.

The day after
The French crossed the Elbe again at Zollenspieker on the following morning, and Tettenborn advancing to Harrburg, cut off all their communications with the left bank of that river. The loss of the Elbe river line and the freedom of movement it gave Blucher was to have a major impact a few days later at Leipzig.

The loss of the French in this engagement amounted to somewhere between one to two thousand killed and taken prisoner, among the latter were General Milozinsky, Colonel Fitzjames aide-de-camp to General Pecheux; Colonel Bourdon, and several other officers. Eight pieces of cannon and twelve ammunition wagons were also captured by the allies. The Allies were to claim nearly two thousand men in killed and wounded, besides fifteen hundred prisoners.

The loss of the allied corps amounted to fifty officers, five hundred men, and two hundred horses; of the King’s German Legion, the third hussars were the principal sufferers; Captain von Hugo, Cornet Bremer, eleven rank and file, and forty-seven horses were killed, and Captains von Beila, von Both, Heise, Adjutant von Bruggemann, Lieutenant von Humboldt, Cornet Oelkers, sixty-four rank and file, and seventy-six horses were wounded.

From want of wagons, many of the wounded were obliged to be left on the field during the night, when the rain fell in torrents, and in the course of the following week, Captains Beila, von Both, and nine hussars of the third died of their wounds.

In 1985 a mass grave containing a thousand bodies from both sides of the conflict was discovered, the site is today marked with a plaque that bears the inscription: "In memory of the soldiers buried here: French, English, Russian and German from battle of 09/16/1813."

An Interesting Map at the local site

Order Of Battle:
French
Allies

Bibliogrpahy:
Schlacht an der Göhrde
Battle of the Göhrde
Kings German Legion
History of the King’s German Legion Vol II, Ludlow Beamish, North
Gefallene und Verwundete der Göhrdeschlacht
Reenactment 2005
Napoleon-Series
Die Schlacht an der Göhrde 1813 - Bastet, Marc
Die Schlacht bei der Göhrde, 16. September 1813 - Benno Bode
Die Schlacht an der Göhrde. Lützows wilde verwegene Jagd - Ernst-August Nebig
Das Treffen an der Göhrde am 16. September 1813 - Bernhard Schwertfeger
Beiheft zum Militärwochenblatt - Schwertfeger
Geschichte Des Herbstfeldzuges Band 2 - Friederich
Geschichte der Nordarmee, Berlin 1894, 2 - Quistorp
Geschichte des Lützowschen Freicorps
Uniforms:
Die Dömitzer Bilderhandschrift aus dem Jahr 1813: Thomas Hemmann
Hanoverian Light Battalions: 1813 - 1815
Hannoverian Freikorps and Landwehr of the Wars of Liberation: the Uniform Plates of Friedrich Neumann
Various Maps