Colonel Saint-Chamans - Liepzig 1813

Comte De Saint-Chamans was the Colonel of the 7e Régiment de Chasseurs à Cheval when he was wounded on the 17th of October 1813 in the vicinity of Wachau during the Battle of Leipzig. The 7e Regiment was ultimately to be destroyed in this battle losing some 17 officers and barely 100 men remained of the 3 squadrons by the the time the French retreated on the 19th.

The morning of the 17th began well enough, at 8:00am his good friend Generale Boyer, who's brigade was posted in a nearby village, came to tell him he had some paté and a few bottles of white wine which he proposed to share with him.

Saint-Chamans, who had been sulking for several days over a decoration that he thought he richly deserved but didn't receive, was over the moon as it had been months since he had had such fine food, unfortunately hardly had they sat down to eat than a cannonade commenced and "as all to often happens in the French Army" they had to rush off "to fight on an empty stomach".

The Regiment found itself in front of some Austrian cavalry but were not strong enough in this sector of the field to launch an attack and so engaged only in some light skirmishing. Marbot's mentions this as a deliberate plan of all the regiments of 2e Cavalry Corps and in typical Marbot style claims responsibility for it.

Then I tried a new plan, namely, to send troopers, well apart, to fire at the enemy's gunners with their carbines. This made the enemy also send out skirmishers, and when skirmishing was thus going on between the lines the enemy's guns could not fire on us for fear of hitting their own people. Ours were of course similarly hampered; but to get the artillery silenced on even a small part of the line was all in our favour, as the enemy was far superior in that arm. Moreover, our infantry was just then at close quarters with that of the enemy in the villages, and the cavalry on both sides had nothing to do but await the issue; so it was of no use for either side to be smashing up the other with cannon-balls. A skirmishing engagement, in which for the most part more powder is burnt than damage done, was a much better way of spending the time. Accordingly, all the colonels followed my example, and much bloodshed was saved. All the cavalry colonels of the 2nd corps approved so highly this plan of economising human life that we all agreed to employ it on the 17th.

The divisional commander Exelmans however did not approve of this idea but as Marbout continues;

... as he was always rushing from one wing to another, as soon as he was a little way from a regiment the colonel would send out his skirmishers and the artillery would cease to speak.

However in front of Saint-Chamans the Austrian's ordered up a battalion of infantry and a horse battery to try to dislodge the chasseurs.

Around 10:00am as they came under direct fire from the battery they began to take heavy casualties, men were being wounded and others were leaving to help them to the rear and as they could do little to respond the Chassuers started to become a little unsettled, Saint-Chamans was just about to say some encouraging words when he himself was thrown from his horse, landing unconscious on the ground.

He appears to have been in some respects extremely lucky, in that the roundshot that knocked him from his horse seems not to have directly struck but instead had hit his giberne, however the blow was strong enough to throw him from his horse, leaving him with concussion, broken ribs and coughing up blood, he remarks he was to have chest pains for many years as a result of this incident.

Saint-Chamans was carried back to the village where he had breakfasted with Boyer, he was attended by his surgeon and another Doctor from the 23e Chasseurs (Marbot's Regiment), they decided he needed bleeding which they proceeded to do immediately.

The village came under attack and looked like it would fall, it was proposed to move Saint-Chamans back to Liepzig, two leagues away, on a stretcher. They made there way slowly along the road but a mile from Liepzig at a larger village they had to stop as they were told the road had been cut by Cossacks, so they found a nearby house to rest in. About 8:00pm they heard the roads had been cleared and they continued in to Leipzig.

On the 19th came the news that the French were to retreat, the house where Saint-Shamans lay was then occupied by some of Marshal Augereau's Grenadiers who prepared to defend it forcing the group to move on. Saint-Chamans was eventually carried to the Hotel de Bavière, occupying the same room that Marshal Ney had previously been using, Saint-Chamans was accompanied by a Doctor, his Surgeon and his brother who also served in the 7e Regiment. Saint-Chamans was too ill to be moved further and the hotel passed into allied hands as the French retreated.

The hotel was first occupied by some passing Prussians who relieved the Saint-Chamans' party of all their money and watches, then later in the day it was occupied by several Russian staff officers who refused to believe the group had been robbed as strict orders had been given that anyone found looting would be shot. They were told to stay in their room and be quiet which they nervously did. Around 10:00pm there was a pounding on the door and they opened it to find a very drunk Cossack Officer and the following conversation then took place:

Cossack - Give me money, I want money.
Doctor - We have nothing, the Prussians took everything from us this morning.
Cossack - The Prussians! Oh, the thieves! Give me your watches, I want your watches.
Doctor - The Prussians have taken them also this morning, they have left us with nothing.
Cossack - The Prussians! ... Those robbers ... You have nothing for us?
Doctor - Alas! No, and here in this bed sir is my Colonel badly wounded, and who has been deprived of everything.
Cossack - Those beggars, what thieves, the Prussians! ... But yet you still have something for me?
Doctor - Look, look for yourself around the room, we have only our clothes.
Cossack - Thieving Prussians! ... but what is this ? (Looking at the strap of Saint-Shamans sword)
Doctor - This is the Colonel's sword.
Cossack - The Colonel is a prisoner ... he no longer needs a sword ... (Looking again at the strap) It's a very nice sword ... I need one... I think I will take this sword for myself ... You don't have anything else?
Doctor - Nothing.
Cossack (opening the door to leave) - Oh, those stealing Prussians! Thieves, I will find them, they must pay me my share!

The night passed without further disturbance, but to prevent a repeat occurrence of the days events they decided they needed to seek protection, they knew enough of the Prussians to want to avoid becoming their prisoner and the idea of being taken by the Russians horrified them, so for several days Saint-Chamans tried to have himself made a prisoner of the Austrians, first through the Austrian staff officers now billeted in the hotel and then later through someone on Bernadotte's staff who knew Metternich but all to no avail.

Ultimately he became a prisoner of the Swede's under Bernadotte and it was some 21 days later that he, along with 40 other officers, left Leipzig heading north to Straslund and then on to Rostock. Eventually he was to be paroled and returned to France, after many trials and tribulations, in 1814. It has to be said that despite the parole this only happened through the repeated intervention of Bernadotte, though Saint-Chamans believed that some of Bernadotte's motivation lay with his aspirations for the French throne after the inevitable removal of Napoleon.

He arrived in Paris on the 23rd March a few days ahead of the Allies but bound by the terms of his parole he felt he could not take part in the final actions of the Empire though one has to imagine that his health at that point would probably have prevented him from being of any useful service anyway. In 1815 he didn't support Napoleon and was made non-active during the hundred days.

Eagle Figures are nice but...

As I mentioned previously I was taking a look at the new Spanish 28mm Napoleonic's from Eagle Figures. From the pictures I had seen they seem quite nice and I thought about getting some to see for myself whether they are just as good 'in the flesh' so to speak before maybe assembling an army to re-fight some of those battles I have described previously here on this blog .

So I went to the Eagle Figures site and selected 20 figures from the Napoleonic Spanish range, which came to a total of GBP18:00 excluding shipping

When I went to check out, the cart showed shipping to Hong Kong as GBP17:68, or alternatively to my UK home address GBP8:25.

That comes to 98% International or 46% domestic for the shipping charges, and although shipping charges do vary throughout the industry these seem rather high to me. For comparison someone like Perry Miniatures charges 20% International and 12% domestic for shipping and Front Rank are 12% domestic and 30% overseas but with discounts for volume, the rest are pretty similar. Eagle offer no discount for volume, those rates are good for however much you order.

I don't know about you but that's a whopping great difference there, at least 3 times the amount others are charging.

Well I thought maybe the cart system is wrong, so to be fair to them I emailed them to make sure it was correct. In fact I have emailed them twice over the last few weeks and to date I have received no response.

So Eagle Figures, as much as I like your figures, as it stands it looks like I am not going to be buying any of them any time soon.


Whilst were talking about Napoleonic Spanish, if you only need Guerrilla's for a skirmish game did you know that Perry Miniatures make some really nice figures, officially tagged for the Carlist Wars but they will do just as well for Napoleonic era. Check out CAT26-CAT29 and civilians CAT15/CAT16 (Carlist Wars - Carlist Forces), some pics below.

Victrix Updates - French, Austrians, Russians

Things have been very quite at Victrix for an awful long time, seems like we haven't heard from them since May and that was only to say they were off on holiday! I was really beginning to wonder about Victrix.

Anyway now they have some news, well actually quite a lot of news:
French

It's been a while since we announced any news at Victrix. It is not that we have not been busy! But there have been a few things going on in the background that have put us a bit behind schedule on our next releases. We are now able to move forward and will have set VX0011 'NAPOLEON'S OLD GUARD CHASSEURS' on release the end of September / early October.

The set will contain 60 figures like our Grenadiers set. It has new heads for the Chasseurs and a new command section. The drummer holding his sabre ready for some action and the officer with raised sword are two very characterful models. A new standard bearer clutching his flag pole in both hands is another great addition. And remember these can be freely intermixed with other French sets from Victrix for even more variety in your units.

Below is an image of the wondferful box art from 'Dan Horsechief', the Chasseurs in a firefight outside the church at Plancenoit

We will have more images of the plastic figures nearer release time..

They look great, though most of the work was done in the Grenadier set released earlier in the year I guess. I actually would like to see these in metal.

Austrians
Interestingly on there Hoplite update page they have this to say:

We are not certain on the release date for these as yet as we are a bit behind on our releases and not sure if these will be be the next sets after the Chasseurs or it may be our Austrians!

Metal Early Napoleonic Russians

Just recieved the first images from Paul Hicks who is in the process of sculpting early Russians for our expanding metals range. These will be from 1805 to 1808.

We should be releasing the first packs late September. The initial releases will be line infantry, Grenadiers, Pavloski Grenadiers, imperial guard in March attack pose with command for all plus mounted colonels. After these Paul will be working on Russian Chasseurs.

Really looking forward to seeing these as Paul has done a lovely job so far on the officers which you can see below. Hopefully more images in the next couple of weeks.

This range will tie in nicely with our Austrian sets being worked on at present and also with our French in Bicornes set.

We will be looking at producing cavalry in plastic.

Really nice figures from Hicks, no argument there, and lots of interesting things coming up I can see. Metal? Hmm I hope this is something we are going to see a lot more off from Victrix, personally I wouldn't mind if they went totally metal (see more on this below) but plastic cavalry??? I can't see the sense in that, surely there is more volume in infantry than cavalry and volume is supposedly what you need in plastics and they would hopefully make it into production a lot faster if metal as well.

With these Russians being 1805/08 I assume the comment about these fitting in with the Austrians means we are getting early Austrians as well. I think it would have been better to have had Austrians and Russians that would do 1809/1812 rather than 1805/08. Whilst I will never turn my nose up at any good Napoleonics, I do wonder whether they might have missed an opportunity here.

Now according to their future releases page coming up should be:

VX00011 French Napoleonic Imperial Guard Chasseur a Pied
VX00012 British Royal Horse Artillery
VX00013 French Napoleonic Imperial Guard (Middle Guard)
VX00014 French Napoleonic Dragoons 1805-12
VX00015 French Napoleonic Dragoons 1812-15
VX00016 French Napoleonic Carabiniers 1805-1810


I love Austrians but guys we have been waiting on those early Carabinier and early Dragoons for a real long time already, maybe 18 months, does this mean they will be put back even further behind the Austrians and then Hoplites, and where are the horses for the limbers?? Without horses those limbers are just a waste of money, how long does it really take to produce them?

If all these sets were metal and not plastic you get the feeling they would probably have long been out the door.

I have to say I have really cooled on the 'plastic revolution'. When it comes to Napoleonics whilst multi pose is a nice idea assembling them is a pain and even if I was going to buy plastic I would go Perry as there are less pieces to assemble than Victrix. Then looking at the quality of the finished product whilst I can admire the original sculpts and marvel at how they have managed to capture a lot of that detail in the plastic product it still is a fact that the detail is lost completely when side on to the mould and is in very low relief elsewhere which is not necessarily ideal for a wargame figure meant to go on the table. I have nothing against people who like plastics, for whatever reason, I am not anti plastic, just for me I don't think they really match metal! IMHO if they switched to metal they would sell more, as well as bringing product to market much quicker than they currently seem able to do and financially this would require a lesser investment.

I start to wish Victrix would actually become a metal rather than plastic manufacturer, I like what they do, their sculpts are as good as anything the Perry do and in my opinion the end product would be better in metal than plastic. Actually I wonder why they don't consider doing both metal and plastic, the metal out first and sold as a complete figure and then the multi pose sprues later, the best of both worlds and more money for them from the same basic sculpt.

There was also some news on the 54mm front:

We had some very good news today from the company that does our tooling.

They are well underway on the 54mm French sets. These will be French Grenadiers 1804 to 1812 and French Voltigeurs 1804 to 1812. Each set will contain 16 figures with plenty of arm and head options.

No images to show at present but hope to have more to show in September. We would hope for a late September or early October release. We will keep you informed when we have more news.

Well at least I will now have something to match up against the British 54mm they released last year.

So lots of news, lots of really great sculpts, congrats guys, but you do get the feeling Victrix are anything but focused.

Tony Lee RIP

Tony Lee a fellow member of HKSW and also one of the co-owners of Dragon Painting Services passed away last week after losing his fight with cancer.

Although not someone I personally knew well, I think one should always salute the passing of a fellow gamer, especially someone like Tony who has been both a significant contributor to the hobby and an active sponsor of our local club for many years.

Tony (and Herbert) via DPS donated many sets of painted figures to our annual auctions over the years, turning them into the highpoint of the AGM's with all the proceeds going to the club, I myself bought some excellent Foundry Austrians at the last auction in May. Their generosity has helped the club maintain a strong financial footing.

A sad loss to the wargaming hobby in general and to the club in Hong Kong! RIP.

Battle of the Göhrde - 16th September 1813

The battle of the Göhrde was a battle of the War of the Sixth Coalition on 16 September 1813 between Napoleonic and Coalition troops at Göhrde in north west Germany. The Napoleonic troops were defeated and withdrew to Hamburg.

Background
Although still officially in a period of armistice, Napoleon wrote Davout on 5th August outlining his plan for a new campaign. The initial objective was Berlin. Davout’s role was to strike east with his field army in support of Marshal Nicolas-Charles Oudinot, who would be attacking north towards Berlin with four corps totaling 60,000 men. The purpose would be to protect the left flank of Oudinot’s army and to crush Bernadotte’s Swedish corps between them. At this time, Davout’s forces were opposed only by a relatively small Allied force (25,000) of mixed nationalities under General Ludwig Wallmoden.

The 13th Corps, advanced as far as Schwerin by the 23rd August. Davout established his headquarters in Schwerin, and there the 13th Corps remained, conducting reconnaissance patrols, but not moving forward.

On 2 September, Davout received word that Oudinot had been defeated 20 miles outside Berlin on August 23rd at Gross Beern and was retreating. Davout immediately fell back to a line along the Stecknitz Canal between Lauenburg and Ratzeburg to cover Hamburg.

Davout XIII Corps held the Lauenburg - Ratzeburg – Lübeck line along the Stecknitz Canal from 4th September until 13th November. The newly-arrived and newly-promoted Général de division Marc Pecheux took over the 50th Division, and Vichery was shifted over to the 40th Division.

Skirmishing with elements of Wallmoden’s corps continued through September all along the front, while elements of the Allied corps crossed to the left bank of the Elbe and began to attack the outposts that guarded Davout’s line of communications between Hamburg and Magdeburg. In an attempt to protect this line, Davout decided to send a detachment under General Pecheux across the Elbe with orders to clear the area to Magdeburg.

By an intercepted letter found on the person of a French artillery officer, who was taken prisoner near Mölln on the 12th, Wallmoden learnt of Davout plan. No time was, therefore, to be lost, and Wallmoden made the whole of the troops under his orders break up from Hagenow and Wittenburg the same night, and march for Dömitz on the Elbe, 30km east of Gohrde, where a pontoon bridge was already prepared.

The reference in the intercepted letter was confirmed by a notification which, it was ascertained, had been received by the authorities on the left bank of the river, directing preparations to be made for the reception of a corps of ten thousand men, and it further appeared that the object of this movement was to clear the neighbourhood of Magdeburg of the allied troops. A tempting opportunity was thus offered to Wallmoden to strike a blow; but it was not unattended with considerable risk; for the greater part of his troops would be thus removed from their line of defence, brought across a great river, and placed several marches from the point of passing, as well as from the rest of the corps, which meantime, would have to observe an enemy far superior in force. These were serious considerations, and such as, under other circumstances would, perhaps, have been sufficient to deter the general from risking the expedition; but encouraged by the timid and irresolute conduct of his opponent during the preceding operations, he felt that he was justified in making the attempt.

Leaving, therefore, the Swedish division, and about six thousand of the new levies, with a regiment of Cossacks and two guns to observe the enemy’s line on the Stecknitz, he assembled at Dömitz a force of some 15,000 men:

With this force Wallmoden passed the Elbe by the pontoon bridge at Dömitz on the night of the 14th and encamped the following day near Dannenberg. The advanced-guard under Tettenborn was pushed on to the Göhrde forest, beyond which, at Dahlenburg half way between Gohrde and Lunenburg, one hundred Cossacks were posted.

Pecheux with 3,500 men, one squadron of Chasseurs and eight guns, had crossed the Elbe at Zollenspieker on the day previous, and advancing through Luneburg to Dahlenburg they drove in the Cossacks, and occupied the Göhrde with their advance guard. The main body encamped behind the forest and near the village of Oldendorf, where a piece of table land, separated from the forest by deep ravines and similarly secured on the flanks, offered an excellent position.

Calculating that the enemy would continue in march on the 16th, Wallmoden closed up the main body of his corps to the vanguard at about five miles from the Göhrde and so placed it that, covered by the inequalities of the ground, he could attack the enemy in march before they were aware of his presence. The advance guard of Cossacks remained in front to mask this manoeuvre; and to cover the retreat two battalions and three squadrons were left in Dannenberg.

Two Alternative Maps of the battle

Battle of the Göhrde
The Cossacks were driven into Metzingen, half-way towards the position of Wallmoden's main body, on the morning of the 16th, but noon had arrived without any further movement on the part of the enemy. This led Wallmoden to fear that the French General was either about to retreat, or contemplated involving the allied troops in protracted manoeuvres on the left bank of the Elbe; he, therefore, took the opinion of his general officers upon the most advisable course to pursue, and, it being decided that the allies should fall upon the enemy without delay, chose a plan for a simultaneous assault upon the enemy’s flanks, rear and centre in three columns.

Left Column:
Six battalions and one regiment of cavalry of the Russian German Legion, together with captain Kuhlmann’s battery of horse artillery of the King’s German Legion were to march under General von Arentschildt through the left side of the forest, taking the roads by Rieberau and Röthen, and moving upon the enemy’s left flank and rear.

Center Column:
Consisting of Tettenborn’s Cossacks, the main part of the artillery, the Jagers and Lutzow Freikorps, the Hanoverian infantry under General Lyon, advancing by the high Lüneburg road, were to fall upon his front.

Right Column:
The remainder of the cavalry under General Dörnberg, with captain Sympher’s battery of artillery and the English rockets, were to flank the attack on the right.

The troops under Arentschildt having to make a great detour before they could arrive at the point of attack, were put in march at twelve o’clock, and one hour afterwards, the columns of Dörnberg and Lyon began to advance on the right and centre.

Just at the moment when the advance-guard of the centre column had commenced skirmishing with the Pecheux’s light troops in the forest, the sound of cannon fire was heard to come from the other side of the Elbe, in the neighbourhood of Boitzenburg, plainly denoting an attack of the French in that quarter. Wallmoden, however, did not allow himself to be embarrassed by the difficulties to which this movement might naturally have been expected to give rise, but directed the light troops of Lützow and Reiche to press forward into the forest, while Tettenborn’s Cossacks advanced on their flank. The French retired, skirmishing, and covered by repeated charges of their chasseuers, upon the main body, at the Steinke Hill the strong position of which only now became fully apparent to the allied commander.

In front was a deep marsh, which stretching towards the Elbe and Bleckede, was lost in a hollow intersected with clefts and trees. The village of Lüben was before their left, and that of Oldendorf in front of their right wing; the troops were drawn out in line upon the table land behind these villages, having their artillery in front, and no sooner did the advance of the allies appear than a heavy fire was opened upon them.

Tettenborn replied from four guns, with which Captain Wiering’s battery, sent forward by General Lyon, soon united its fire, though at this point it was still largely ineffective. However the attack by the Freikorps infantry and cavalry on the French main position was repulsed with terrible losses, Major von Lutzow himself was wounded seriously.

About half an hour later Arentschildt, leading his columns from the forest, brought his artillery also into action, finally around 4 o'clock Arentschildt arrived in front of Oldendorf, though it was to be another hour before  Wallmoden ordered a coordinated attack by all his troops, as all the artillery was brought up.

The French surprised at seeing a large body of infantry where they only expected light troops, began to make immediate dispositions for retreat; the absence of their General, however, who was in front with his advanced posts, delayed these movements, and he had scarce arrived, when the allies commenced the attack. He however remained remarkably cool and calmly issued his orders. So far he was doing well, his artillery was effective in supporting his defensive position and the Chasseurs-a-Cheval although small in number were very active repeatedly charging from behind the Steinke Hill, particularly towards Luben and Dornberg's cavalry, his losses were small, only a single gun had been lost to the Freikorps. Even when a charge by the 3rd Hanoverian Hussars finally managed to break into his main position the overall situation was still little changed.

Around 5:30pm Arentschildt’s infantry charging with the bayonet on the left, gained possession of the village of Oldendorf and then took Eichdorf at 6:00pm with a single battalion though quickly supported by horse artillery, while the cavalry of Dörnberg on the right assailed the opposite flank. Arentschildt’s battalions met with a fierce resistance, and nearly one hundred of his brave followers were killed and wounded; but the French column had been shaken by the charge, and bringing up his regiment of hussars, they, in a most gallant assault, completed the defeat of the opposing mass.

Dreading now the onset of Dörnberg’s cavalry on the left, the French formed their columns into squares, and commenced a well ordered retreat, pouring a murderous fire from each square, as it successively fell back. General Pécheux accepting now that he would not be able to hold his position had decided to retreat to the north over Eichdorf and Breese the only route left open to him.

The fire of the horse artillery and rockets was brought to bear upon the French, but it had produced little effect, when the 3rd Hussars of the King’s German Legion were ordered to charge. Led on by Major Küper, the hussars rode boldly forward against the square which was in advance; but a hollow way not visible at a distance, appeared, on a nearer approach, to run in front of the square, and the squadrons, being unable to pass it, failed in the intended attack, while Captain von Beila and several men and horses were wounded by the enemy’s fire.

Moving, however, round the left flank of the enemy, three squadrons of the hussars formed in front of one of the rear squares, which they charged with distinguished gallantry and complete success, but experienced the loss of captain von Hugo, and cornet Bremer killed, and Captains von Both and Heise wounded, besides many men and horses. The remaining squadrons now broke a third square, and a bold soldier of the fifth squadron, named Heymann, seizing the enemy'’ General Milozinsky, dragged him, with the aid of sergeant Wedemeyer from the midst of the disordered troops. (Corporals Duntemann and Schaper, as well as hussars Stenzig and Schwan were also conspicuous for their gallantry in the attack on the enemy’s squares.)

Meantime the square against which the first attack of the hussars had failed, was charged by the infantry brigade of Lieutenant-Colonel Hugh Halkett, consisting of the battalions of Lauenburg, Langrehr, and Bennigsen, which falling fiercely upon the enemy with the bayonet, forced them to give way, and the hussars pressed after the fugitives.

The French continued to form again in the rear, and they maintained an obstinate resistance in retreat, until the repeated charges of the allies, and the destructive fire of their artillery and rockets, spread such terror through the retiring ranks, that order could no longer be preserved, and breaking, they fled in all directions.

This general disorder soon communicated itself to the troops which had been placed to cover their retreat, and the pursuit having been pushed on to Nahrendorf, the enemy found themselves cut off from the road to Dahlenburg, and obliged to retire by Bleckede, their general, stripped of his horses and baggage, saving himself on foot. About half past seven in the evening, Wallmoden committed the pursuit to the Cossacks and drew back the remainder of the troops to the Göhrde castle, where they encamped.

The day after
The French crossed the Elbe again at Zollenspieker on the following morning, and Tettenborn advancing to Harrburg, cut off all their communications with the left bank of that river. The loss of the Elbe river line and the freedom of movement it gave Blucher was to have a major impact a few days later at Leipzig.

The loss of the French in this engagement amounted to somewhere between one to two thousand killed and taken prisoner, among the latter were General Milozinsky, Colonel Fitzjames aide-de-camp to General Pecheux; Colonel Bourdon, and several other officers. Eight pieces of cannon and twelve ammunition wagons were also captured by the allies. The Allies were to claim nearly two thousand men in killed and wounded, besides fifteen hundred prisoners.

The loss of the allied corps amounted to fifty officers, five hundred men, and two hundred horses; of the King’s German Legion, the third hussars were the principal sufferers; Captain von Hugo, Cornet Bremer, eleven rank and file, and forty-seven horses were killed, and Captains von Beila, von Both, Heise, Adjutant von Bruggemann, Lieutenant von Humboldt, Cornet Oelkers, sixty-four rank and file, and seventy-six horses were wounded.

From want of wagons, many of the wounded were obliged to be left on the field during the night, when the rain fell in torrents, and in the course of the following week, Captains Beila, von Both, and nine hussars of the third died of their wounds.

In 1985 a mass grave containing a thousand bodies from both sides of the conflict was discovered, the site is today marked with a plaque that bears the inscription: "In memory of the soldiers buried here: French, English, Russian and German from battle of 09/16/1813."

An Interesting Map at the local site

Order Of Battle:
French
Allies

Bibliogrpahy:
Schlacht an der Göhrde
Battle of the Göhrde
Kings German Legion
History of the King’s German Legion Vol II, Ludlow Beamish, North
Gefallene und Verwundete der Göhrdeschlacht
Reenactment 2005
Napoleon-Series
Die Schlacht an der Göhrde 1813 - Bastet, Marc
Die Schlacht bei der Göhrde, 16. September 1813 - Benno Bode
Die Schlacht an der Göhrde. Lützows wilde verwegene Jagd - Ernst-August Nebig
Das Treffen an der Göhrde am 16. September 1813 - Bernhard Schwertfeger
Beiheft zum Militärwochenblatt - Schwertfeger
Geschichte Des Herbstfeldzuges Band 2 - Friederich
Geschichte der Nordarmee, Berlin 1894, 2 - Quistorp
Geschichte des Lützowschen Freicorps
Uniforms:
Die Dömitzer Bilderhandschrift aus dem Jahr 1813: Thomas Hemmann
Hanoverian Light Battalions: 1813 - 1815
Hannoverian Freikorps and Landwehr of the Wars of Liberation: the Uniform Plates of Friedrich Neumann
Various Maps

Crag Piquet (Part II) 15th December 1863

The North-West Frontier didn't seem to be too popular with you all, though for me, my interest is somewhat piqued, maybe a small skirmish game say very much in the old vintage style wargaming would be ideal. Rules? Figures?

Anyway I might as well finish off Crag Piquet, here is the action from the 15th/16th December that finally wrapped it all up after three months of being stuck at Crag Piquet. This from an account by FS Roberts. (see part I to catch up on where we are at).

Sir Hugh Rose had been accorded permission to take command of the troops in the field, and had sent word to General Garvock not 'to attempt any operations until further orders.' James (the Commissioner), however, thinking that the situation demanded immediate action, as disturbances had broken out in other parts of the Peshawar valley, deprecated delay, and pressed Garvock to advance, telling him that a successful fight would put matters straight. Garvock consented to follow the Commissioner's advice, and arranged to move on the following day.

The force was divided into three columns. The first and second--consisting of about 4,800 men, and commanded respectively by Colonel W. Turner, C.B., and Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde, C.B.--were to form the attacking party, while the third, about 3,000 strong, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan, was to be left for the protection of the camp.

At daybreak, on the 15th, the troops for the advance, unencumbered by tents or baggage, and each man carrying two days' rations, assembled at the base of the 'Crag piquet'. Turner, an excellent officer, who during the short time he had been at Umbeyla had inspired great confidence by his soldierly qualities, had on the previous afternoon reconnoitred to the right of the camp, and had discovered that about 4,000 men were holding the village of Lalu, from which it was necessary to dislodge them before Umbeyla could be attacked. On being told to advance, therefore, Turner moved off in the direction of Lalu, and, driving the enemy's piquets before him, occupied the heights overlooking the valley, out of which rose, immediately in front about 200 yards off, a conical hill which hid Lalu from view. This hill, which was crowded with Hindustani fanatics and their Pathan allies, was a most formidable position; the sides were precipitous, and the summit was strengthened by 'sangars'. No further move could be made until the enemy were dislodged, so Turner lined the heights all round with his Infantry, and opened fire with his Mountain guns.

Meanwhile, Wilde's column had cleared off the enemy from the front of the camp, and formed up on Turner's left. On the advance being sounded, Turner's Infantry rushed down the slopes, and in ten minutes could be seen driving the enemy from the heights on his right; at the same time the 101st Fusiliers, the leading regiment of Wilde's column, made straight for the top of the conical hill, and, under cover of the fire from the Mountain guns of both columns, and supported by the Guides, 4th Gurkhas, and 23rd Pioneers, they climbed the almost perpendicular sides. When near the top a short halt was made to give the men time to get their breath; the signal being then given, amidst a shower of bullets and huge stones, the position was stormed, and carried at the point of the bayonet. It was a grand sight as Adye and I watched it from Hughes's battery; but we were considerably relieved when we perceived the enemy flying down the sides of the hill, and heard the cheers of the gallant Fusiliers as they stood victorious on the highest peak.

Now that the enemy were on the run it was the time to press them, and this Turner did so effectually that the leading men of his column entered Lalu simultaneously with the last of the fugitives. The rapidity of this movement was so unexpected that it threw the enemy inside the walls into confusion; they made no stand, and were soon in full retreat towards Umbeyla and the passes leading into Buner.

While affairs were thus prospering on our right, the enemy, apparently imagining we were too busy to think of our left, came in large numbers from the village of Umbeyla, threatening the camp and the communications of the second column. Wilde, however, was prepared for them, and held his ground until reinforced by Turner, when he made a forward movement. The Guides, and detachments of the 5th Gurkhas and 3rd Sikhs, charged down one spur, and the 101st down another; the enemy were driven off with great slaughter, leaving a standard in the hands of the Gurkhas, and exposing themselves in their flight to Turner's guns. During the day they returned, and, gathering on the heights, made several unsuccessful attacks upon our camp. At last, about 2 p.m., Brownlow, who was in command of the right defences, assumed the offensive, and, aided by Keyes, moved out of the breastworks and, by a succession of well-executed charges, completely cleared the whole front of the position, and drove the tribesmen with great loss into the plain below.

All opposition having now ceased, and the foe being in full retreat, the force bivouacked for the night. We had 16 killed and 67 wounded; while our opponents admitted to 400 killed and wounded.

The next morning we were joined by Probyn with 200 sabres of the 11th Bengal Lancers and the same number of the Guides; and after a hasty breakfast the order was given to march into the Chamla valley. My duty was to accompany the Mountain batteries and show them the way. As we
debouched into comparatively open country, the enemy appeared on a ridge which completely covered our approach to Umbeyla, and we could descry many standards flying on the most prominent points. The road was so extremely difficult that it was half-past two o'clock before the whole force was clear of the hills.

General Garvock, having made a careful reconnaissance of the enemy's position, which was of great strength and peculiarly capable of defence, had decided to turn their right, a movement which was to be entrusted to the second column, and I was told to inform Turner that he must try and cut them off from the Buner Pass as they retreated. I found Turner close to Umbeyla and delivered my message. He moved forward at once with the 23rd Pioneers and a wing of the 32nd Pioneers in line, supported by the second wing, having in reserve a wing of the 7th Royal Fusiliers.

When we had passed the village of Umbeyla, which was in flames, having been set fire to by our Cavalry, the wing of the 32nd was brought up in prolongation of our line to the right. The advance was continued to within about 800 yards of the Buner Pass, when Turner, observing a large body of the enemy threatening his left flank, immediately sent two companies of the Royal Fusiliers in that direction. Just at that moment a band of 'Ghazis' furiously attacked the left flank, which was at a disadvantage, having got into broken ground covered with low jungle. In a few seconds five of the Pioneer British officers were on the ground, one killed and four wounded; numbers of the men were knocked over, and the rest, staggered by the suddenness of the onslaught, fell back on their reserve, where they found the needed support, for the Fusiliers stood as firm as a rock.

At the critical moment when the 'Ghazis' made their charge, Wright, the Assistant-Adjutant-General, and I, being close by, rushed in amongst the Pioneers and called on them to follow us; as we were personally known to the men of both regiments, they quickly pulled themselves together and responded to our efforts to rally them. It was lucky they did so, for had there been any delay or hesitation, the enemy, who thronged the slopes above us, would certainly have come down in great numbers, and we should have had a most difficult task. As it was, we were entirely successful in repulsing the 'Ghazis', not a man of whom escaped. We counted 200 of the enemy killed; our losses were comparatively slight--8 killed and 80 wounded.

We bivouacked for the night near the village of Umbeyla, and the next morning the Bunerwals, who, true to their word, had taken no part in the fighting on the 15th or 16th, came in and made their submission.

.... So back to Napoleonic's next week ....

New Foundry Napoleonic Russian Cavalry

I saw on TGN that Foundry have released 'brand new' Early Russians. I assume the 'brand new' is to distinguish them from the 'old stuff we removed from the catalog but which we are now putting back in at last'.

That said...
Is it me, the photograph or do those standard bearers look really odd to you, I mean what is going on with the arms?

Mind you the troopers arms are not perfect either, I can't say they are bad but the left arms seem to me to be held to high across the chest. It might seem a tad harsh, but these figures are not cheap, we are not talking OG prices here, if you make me pay top of the market prices I expect top of the market quality not OG level.

Of course if you really, really need early Russians do you have much choice??

Perry Miniatures - Battery Commanders

Perry have posted pics of the new Battery Commanders, nothing on the new DB Limber but maybe the argument is "please see French Limber", anyway here are some pics of some other DB's that I hadn't noticed or just forgot about.

The Battery Commanders are a useful addition, they are up to the usual Perry standard even if not really awe inspiring. Can you say 'run of the mill Perry' without seeming like you are putting them down? Well 'run of the mill Perry' is better than the best of almost anyone else out there but it gets a bit silly if you just label everything as gobsmackingly beautiful doesn't it. The DB's below are more at the 'beautiful' end of the scale.

British and Hanoverian Army 1815

Battery commanders (1 RHA, Mercer, 2 RA)

Napoleonic Dutch/Belgians 1815

Cavalry commanders (includesTrip,Ghigny and an orderly trumpeter from the 6th Hussars)

Cavalry casualties

Action at Choignes 18th January 1814

A forgotten action that took place in the area of Laville-aux-Bois, Biesles and Choignes between the Wurtemburg IV Corps (13,000) and the 1e Division of Friant's Old Guard (5,900 men) with the 3e Division of Laferrière-Leveque Young Guard (2,500 men) led by Marshal Morier.

Mortier was retiring in front of Schwarzenberg's Army Of Bohemia. After delaying Gyulay at Langres, Mortier retired toward Chaumont, there he repulsed the Wurttemburgers before continuing to retire on Bar-sure-Aube.

Langres 17th January 1814
On 16th leaving the bivouac fires burning and a rearguard in Langres, the bearskins filed through Langres around midnight. The rearguard followed at 6:00am and took post at Vesagines halfway between Langres and Chaumont. That evening Mortier quartered at Chaumont. On the left bank of the Marne one detachment occupied the hills of Marnay which dominated the river crossings between Vesagines and Chaumont. Any Allied force pursuing from Langres would have to cross the defile at Marnay, which dominated the river. On the right bank, a second detachment of Dragoons and infantry secured Laville-aux-Bois on the Montigny-le-Roi to Chaumont road. Patrols from this second detachment detected Wurttemberg cavalry on the road less than 10 miles southesast of Chaumont at the town of Bieseles.

By the night of the 17th the Guard reached Chaumont. Mortier reported his troops were exhausted particularly the Dragoons and Chasseurs-a-Cheval. He summoned three battalions (1800 men) of the 113e Regiment from Troyes to Chaumont as support but they were 50 miles away, he also had no idea what had happened to the Christiani's 2e Old Guard Division.

On the Allied side the entire day of the 17th passed without Gyulay realising that the French had retreated. Around 2pm an ADC to Schwarzenberg road to the city gates to open negotiations, finding no guards he entered the suburburbs and learnt of Mortier's departure. A stunned Gyulay finally got into action and at 4:30pm his advanced guard deployed at the "Dijon" Gate, by 6:00 Langres had capitulated.

Gyulay pushed the 3rd Curaissier Division and Crenville's light infantry division through Langres to Humes on the road to Chaumont. The main body of the III Corps camped at Langres. Colloredo's I Corps moved into position between Langres and Longeau, where also Wimpffen 2nd Division arrived from Dijon. Gyulay however failed to notify the Wurttemburgers of Mortiers retreat.

In fact the Wurttemberers did not hear of the retreat until the early hours of the 18th. Fredrick William had spent the 17th leading the IV Corps from Bourbonne-les-Bains to Montigny-le-Roi in compliance with Schwarzenbergs order to reach Langres by 1:00pm on the 18th.

The advance guard under Stockmeyer reached Frecourt on the road from Montigny-le-Roi to Langres. Jetts' Cavalry Brigade of 8 Squadrons and one horse battery turned on to the Montigny-le-Roi to Chaumont road to protect the Corps flank stopping at Biesles, he reported that the French had evacuated Chaumont.



The Action at Chaumont/Choignes on 18th January 1814
With Gyulay having lost contact with Mortier, Schwarzenberg assumed that he had retreated through Chaumont and kept on going north, he expected to take Chaumont as easily as Langres.

He issued fresh orders for the 18th. The IV Corps and 3 regiments of the 3rd Curassier Division would advance on Chaumont. As the Wurttembergers marched on the right bank of the Marne along the Montigny-le-Roi to Chaumont, the Russian heavy cavalry would advance along the Langres-Chaumont down the left bank to the defile at Marnay. Behind the Russians Guylay would concentrate his corps at Humes while Colloredo remained between Longeau and Langres.

The Wurttembergers assembled before dawn on the 18th, to form the advanced guard Jett's brigade was reinforced by one infantry regiment. Jett commenced the advance at 7:00am in a downpour. Stockmeyer who should have followed Jett mistakenly continued his advance on Langres. The time spent in correcting Stockmeyer then delayed the main body of the corps which was bringing up the rear.

The two squadrons that formed Jett's vanguard proceeded towards Chaumont. Passing through Biesles around noon they clashed with French cavalry and infantry at Laville-aux-Bois. Prinz Fredrick William who joined the advance guard rushed forward the 4th cavalry Regiment followed by the 2nd Cavalry Regiment and the Horse Artillery. Reaching Laville-aux-Bois the Crown Prince charged the French left flank and threatened to envelop their position. The arrival of superior numbers force the French to yield the road, retreat through Laville-aux-Bois and recross the Marne to Chaumont's suburb of Choignes. Two French battalions posted on the right bank covered the cavalry's passage and halted the Wurttembergers pursuit.

Chaumont stood on a hill overlooking the left bank of the Marne. As for man made defenses, crumbling ramparts and a trench extended across the city's eastern and southern sides. Nature provided Chaumont's best protection. The city was situated on a peninsular surrounded by the Marne and Suize Rivers which merged north of the city. The steep banks and a considerable depth of both rivers posed difficult obstacles, particularly as the Marne was flooding. Two stone bridges spanned the Marne, one at Choignes and the other further north directly across from Chaumont. Heavy artillery covered the approaches to both crossings, which were guarded by strong infantry posts. A rearguard at Chamarandes held the road from Langres on the left bank.

Mortier initially though the Allies were conducting a strong reconaisance so moved three batteries - two horse and one foot - to the left bank of the Marne to keep the Wurttembergers at a respectful distance. While the French positioned there batteries and unlimbered the guns the Wurttemberg 3rd Cavalry Regiment came up followed by Jett's light infantry. The soldier continued their advance on the Montigny-le-Roi to Chaumont road to the point where the lane leading to Choignes veered from the main road. Behind them the 7th Infantry Regiment continued along the main road to a hill facing the northern bridge directly opposite Chaumont where the regiment halted just outside of Mortier's artillery range. During this time Franquermont gradually brought up the main body of the corps to support the advance guard. Seeing the Allied infantry arrive, Mortier pulled back his two battalions to the left bank.

To take Choignes, the 1st Battalion of the 9th Jager Regiment moved through a gorge north of the lane that led to the bridge at Choignes. Two Wurttemberg horse batteries unlimbered across from Chaumont to answer the French artillery. Despite the fire of the French batteries, which Mortier claimed to have "great effect", the jager reached Choignes's bridge, charged across and entered the portion of the suburb on the left bank of the Marne. Once across the bridge, they received fire from the houses on both sides of the street. Unable to counterfire because of the heavy rains that soaked their cartridges the jager were forced to clear the French house by house with bayonet. Although the battalion managed to take the village for a moment, Mortier had dispatched a single battalion of 400 Old Guard Grenadiers to deal with them, the grenadiers-a-pied of the Old Guard advanced from Chaumont, fixed their bayonets and charged into the disorganized Wurttembergers. No match for the Imperial Guard the Wurttemberg light infantry broke. The Guard drove a good number of the Allied soldiers into the river, the violent current of which claimed many. According to Mortier's after action report, Allied corpses littered both the village and bridge. His grenadiers took sixty prisoners in the process, while purportedly suffering only five wounded.

Elsewhere, Duka had dispatched six squadrons along the old Roman road that ran along the left bank of the Suize to reach Chaumont though this river valley. Although the reasons are unclear, this mission did not succeed. With his remaining ten squadrons, Duka moved north on the main Langres-Chaumont road. Outside of Vesagines, the Russian cavalry encountered enemy vedettes. The French conducted a slow, fighting withdrawal to Marnay's defile; infantry waited to ambush Duka's squadrons where the road narrowed between the hills of the left bank and the Marne. More accustomed to shock tactics than the duties of light cavalry, the curassiers imprudently charged into the tight embanked valley. Greeted by a strong fusillade from the hills that dominated the defile, the Russians feel back on Rolamport after losing several men and requested the support of the Austrian infantry. Gyulay complied that same night, sending one battalion, one half battery, and one light cavalry squadron to open the road the next day.
After waiting in vain for the anticipated Russian diversion, Fredick William postponed any further operations His enter corps had arrived but reconnaissance revealed the overall strength of Mortiers position. In view of the Guards apparent commitment to a serious resistance, the crown prince refused to accept a frontal assault until the III Corps advanced along the left bank of the Marne to assail Chaumont from the South. Although he had not received any word from Gyulay, the Wurttembergerer hoped the advance would take place on the next day, the 18th. With this in mind he sought to fix the French at Chaumont until the III Corps could assault Mortiers exposed right flank. For the remainder of the 18th, the French and Wurttemberg gunners engaged in an artillery duel that tested the mettle of the latter's horse batteries, which could barely stand against Mortier's heavier guns. The French made a few attempts to retake the the portion of Choignes on the right bank of the Marne but the charge across the bridge proved too costly. By dusk, flames engulfed the suburb and combat ended. Fredreick Willaim's headquarters passed the night at Bielses with the main body of the corps withdrawing into tight quarters between that town  and Laville-aux-Bois. Jett's advanced guard maintained  its position on the right bank of the Marne and spent  a miserable winter night bivouacked in streaming rain and on ground so drenched that the mens sunk into the mud up to their shins.

Mortier decided around 3:00am on the 19th to withdraw via Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises towards Bar-sur-Aube to await reinforcements, the rear guard left at 5:00am and the first Wurttemberg cavalry entered Chaumont at 8:00am and the town capitulated. Once again the Allies lost touch with Mortier and couldn't find any trace of which direction he had retreated in.

Choignes which had been shelled by both sides was a burnt out ruin.

According Litre (note p.20) "we" lost less than five hundred men and "they" lost fifteen hundred.

According to von Hoen ("Hauptarmée 1814", p.22), French 1200 losses, 900 Allied casualties.

The day after
The headquarters of the Bohemian army moved to Langres on the 20th, but the Württembergers remained for five days in Chaumont trying to recover from effects of the cold and wet weather.

The movements of the Austrian corps Gyulay
The Austrian Corps under Gyulay had occupied Langres on 17th January but on 18th January left to pursue Mortier along the left bank of the Marne on the road to Chaumont. At Versaignes-sur-Marne, they caught up to the French rearguard and pursued them as far as the village of Marnay-sur-Marne. As night fell they ceased the pursuit. The next day Gyulay learned that the Wurttemberg troops had already occupied Chaumont, and that the French had moved on in haste. His forces moved a little closer to Chaumont halting between the towns of Richebourg and Foulain.

OOB - Forces around Chaumont on the 18th

Another view of the bridge Choignes. The Wurtembergers, coming from the Bourbonne-les-Bains - Montigny-le-Roi - Chaumont road, arrived to sieze the bridge before being driven off near this wooded hillside.

Bibliography:
The Fall of Napoleon: The allied invasion of France, 1813-1814
By Michael V. Leggiere
Victoires, conquêtes, désastres, revers et guerres civiles des ..., Volume 23
By Charles-Théodore Beauvais
Dictionnaire des Batailles
By Pigeard
Histoire des campagnes de 1814 et 1815, en France, Volume 1
By Frederic Guillaume de Vaudoncourt
Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de la campagne de 1814, Volume 1
By Jean Baptiste Frédéric Koch
Recueil de pièces officielles destinées à détromper les François ..., Volume 4
edited by Frédéric Schoell
Historique de l'artillerie de la Garde

Uniforms:Württemberg Chevauxleger Update

Well it's not usual that I have to do a follow up post on a particular unit but as I noted in the original post the problem with the Württemberg Uniforms is that not only is their a paucity of information but also what information that is available is so wildly contradictory.

The most extensive information readily available comes from Rawkins and Histofig but unfortunately it is not possible to reconcile the two, they vary so much that simply one has to be right and the other wrong.

So unless you are willing to do the research yourself and go back to original sources how can you know which is correct?

Well after that article Uwe Ehmke wrote to me and essentially said that is exactly what he has done, in fact the Histofig information is just that, it represents the distillation of JP Perconte's and his own extensive research into original source archives and documents.

Lets for a moment look at the sources cited by Rawkins and Histofig (see below). First we can see a problem with Rawkins is the lack of cited sources and then the main ones he does cite he very clearly doesn't follow, Knotel and Faber du Four bear no relation to Rawkins descriptions whereas Lienhart Et Humbert do but he doesn't cite them, and I am not even sure Albrecht Adams even shows any Wurttembergers, this is sad as he clearly has done research but without details you can't say where anything in particular comes from and this is important as even without the contradictions, certainly in respect of the Chevauxleger, some of the information doesn't make sense. Histofig on the other hand is staggeringly extensive, and is hard to fault, if you want to dispute any of it, its all laid out for you.

So where does that leave us, well in conclusion I think you have to say that we should rely upon the Perconte/Ehmke information on Histofig and discard Rawkins at very least where it is contradictory. I have updated the original post to reflect this.

Uwe also sent along two very nice drawings of Trumpeter of the Chevuaxleger:

The trompeters of the chevaulegers had a blue uniforms without swallow-nests 1806-9 then yellow uniforms

Many thanks Uwe.




Sources cited by Rawkins:

"Only the main and readily available sources of information have been listed here as much credit
is owed to the invaluable assistance given by the staffs of many Libraries and Museums in many
parts of Europe given whilst compiling my basic research notes."
Knötel Uniformkunde and Handbuch der Uniformkunde.
The Plates and Drawings of: Hourtoulle, Augsburger Bilder, Albrecht Adam, Rigo., Faber du Four, Heap.

Sources cited by Histofig:
As ever Histofig is very hard to use, not only is the Wurttemberg document index difficult to locate the sources page referenced there is a broken link the correct page for the source is here: sources cited on Histofig

To save you the trouble here is the list.

Documents

DAS KÖNIGLICH WÜRTTEMBERGISCHE HEER 1806-1871 de HERBERT HAHN (publié par l’association allemande Deutschen Gesellschaft für Heereskunde Beckum 1994).
DIE WÜRTTEMBERGISCHEN HANDWAFFEN 1806-1870 de HANS RECKENDORF Berlin, Bonn, Herford, Mittler, 1993.
THE WURTTEMBURG ARMY 1793-1815 de GEORGES NAFZIGER Novembre 1993.
THE ARMIES OF BADEN AND WÜRTTEMBERG 1806-1814 de W.J. RAWKINS 1977.
STATES OF THE RHEINBUND, THE KINGDOM OF WÜRTTEMBERG de JOHN HENDERSON.
KLEINE UNIFORMKUNDE VON BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG de KARL-HERMANN FRHR. VON BRAND publié par G.Braun à Karlsruhe (année ?).
LES UNIFORMES DE L’ARMÉE FRANÇAISE, TOME V "LES TROUPES ALLIÉES", LIENHART ET HUMBERT - pour le Württemberg voir les pages 133 à 150 et les planches N°25 à N°29.
GESCHICHTE DES FELDZUGES 1814 GEGEN FRANREICH de FRITZ V. HILLER publié à Stuttgart en 1893.
ERINNERUNGEN AUS DEN FELDZÜGEN DER WÜRTTEMBERGER 1806 UND 1807 IN SCHLESSEN de F. SCHNEIDER publié à Stuttgart en 1866.
DIE WÜRTTEMBERGER IN DEN NAPOLEONISCHEN KRIEGEN de HEINZ KRAFT publié en 1856 à Stuttgart.
GESCHICHTE DES WÜRTTEMBERGISCHEN KRIEGSWESENS VON DER FRÜHESTEN BIS ZUR NEUESTEN ZEIT. de STADLINGER L.J., Stuttgart,1856 (texte et planches).

Articles

ZINNFIGUR :
Année 1958 Article de PETER WACKER sur la campagne des Wurttembergeois dans le Voralberg en 1809 (sous la considération particulière de l’uniformologie des nouvelles formations)
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR HEERESKUNDE :
Année 1930 (octobre-novembre) Article de Hans M. Brauer Die letzen Württemberger bei der Grossen Armee von 1813. pages 195 et 196
Année 1932 (1er trimestre) Article de Hans M. Brauer Die Fahnen der Württembergischen Infanterie 1811-1815. pages 349 à 351
Année 1932 (1er trimestre) Article de Hans M. Brauer Noch einmal Württembergische Louis-Jäger zu Pferde 1809. page 351
Année 1934 (avril) Notes de R Knötel sur les Bataillons d’infanterie légère 1805 et le Fusiliers Regiment 1806 pages 63 et 64
Année 1934 (octobre) Article de Richard Knötel - Notizen über die württembergische Armee . pages 135 et 136
Année 1978 Article de Friedrich Hermann - die Erstürmung von Sens durch die Württemberger am 11 Februar 1814 - (2 planches sur cette bataille de Sens)
Année 1978 Article de Friedrich Hermann - Württembergische Offiziersrangabzeichen 1799-1817 - (sur les grades des officiers)
BULLETIN DES COLLECTIONNEURS DE FIGURINES HISTORIQUES
N°2 de 1959 Article de ROGER FORTHOFFER - Bavarois et Wurtembourgeois en Russie en 1812
TRADITION MAGAZINE
N° spécial 42-43 sur les Chasseurs à cheval. Article d’ALAIN PIGEARD Les chasseurs à cheval wurtembergeois : le régiment Duc Louis
DEPESCHE UNIFORMEN UND HEERE VERGANGENER ZEITEN
N°5 Die württembergische Armee 1812 de R. KÖGEL
N°8 Die württembergische Armee 1812 de R. KÖGEL et E WAGNER (2 planches)
N°9 Königlich württembergisches Militär 1806-1808 de U. EHMKE (1 planche)
N°19 Die württembergische Armee 1812 de R. KÖGEL et E WAGNER (1 planche)
N°19 Württembergische Tambours 1812 de U. EHMKE (1 planche)
N°20 Die Württembergischen Feldzugs-uniformen 1812 nach Faber du Faur de K. TOHSCHE (4 planches)
N°21 Die Württembergischen Feldzugs-uniformen 1812 nach Faber du Faur de K. TOHSCHE (4 planches)
N°23 Die Württembergischen Feldzugs-uniformen 1812 nach Faber du Faur de K. TOHSCHE (3 planches)
N°25 Württembergisches Sanitätswesen de U. EHMKE et T. TENGE (1 planche)

Plates and Drawings

Lithographies de Christian WILHELM VON FABER DU FAUR " BLÄTTER AUS MEINEN PORTEFEUILLE, IM LAUFE DES FELDZUGS 1812 IN RUSSLAND… "Stuttgard 1831-1843.
Dessins de WEILAND : voir le Hors série N°4 de Tradition Magazine consacré au MANUSCRIT DE WEILAND - Uniformes de l’Armée française et de ses alliés de 1806 à 1815 -. Les 16 planches qui concernent les troupes du Württemberg se trouvent de la page 50 à la page 58.
ABBILDUNG DES KOENIGLICH WURTEMBERG’SCHEN MILITAIRS in der Ebnerschen Kunsthandlung in Stuttgart 1857 publié par EBNER. Cette série ne présente que les tenues des officiers des différents corps du Württemberg. 8 planches ont été publiées dans le livre de Herbert Hahn Das Königlich Württembergische Heer 1806-1871.
ABBILDUNG DES WÜRTTEMBERGISCHEN MILITAIRS VON DEN FRÜHESTEN BIS ZUR GEGENWÄRTIGEN ZEIT. Stuttgart. Il existe à notre connaissance plusieurs séries publiées par Ebner : une est déposée au Cabinet des Estampes BN Paris sous la référence Ob 822 mais nous en avons également consulté deux autres pour des périodes différentes dans des collections privées en Allemagne.
DIE KÖNIGL. WÜRTEMBURGISCHE ARMEE 1808-1816 Tome 1 Cabinet des Estampes BN Paris Référence Ob 312 (Petit Folio).
Planches de RICHARD KNÖTEL UNIFORMENKUNDE (Librairie Max Babenzien à Rathenow)
I/26 Cavalerie 1812 I/36 Infanterie légère 1806 II/14 Mousquetaire 1799
III/55 Officiers 1812 V/60 Infanterie 1813 VI/36 Garde à cheval 1815
VI/37 Leib Garde 1806 X/47 Gardes du Corps 1808 X/48 Infanterie 1808
X/49 Artillerie 1808 X/52 Infanterie 1808 X/53 Chasseurs à cheval 1808
X/54 Chasseurs et légers 1808 X/57 Leib chasseurs 1808 X/58 Garde à pied 1808
X/59 Chevau-légers 1808
Planches et vignettes d’HERBERT KNÖTEL :
série UNIFORMENKUNDE NEUE FOLGE N°1 (Artillerie à cheval en Russie 1812), 3 vignettes : bataillon léger 1805, infanterie 1809 et Garde du Corps 1810
série de vignettes que KNÖTEL LE JEUNE a consacrée aux troupes allemandes ayant combattu pour la Guerre de Libération de l’Allemagne entre 1813 et 1814 et qui se divise pour le Württemberg en deux séries :
N°22 (6 vignettes) Etat-major et troupes à pied
N°23 (6 vignettes) Cavalerie, Artillerie et Landwehr.
Planches de la série UNIFORMBOGEN de BRAUER et HERBERT KNÖTEL :
planche N°42 sur l’infanterie de ligne 1807-1817
planche N° 28 sur la cavalerie 1805-1815
3 planches de BOISSELIER :
cavalerie du Württemberg 1807-1809
régiment de Dragons du Pince Royal 1812
régiment de chevau-légers du Corps N°2 1812
6 cartes de RENE NORTH de la série N° 76 Württemberg Chevaulegers 1808-1813
HEERE DER VERGANGENHEIT de JÜRGEN OLMES planches N°38 et 39 sur l’Artillerie du Württemberg en 1812.
Série de dessins sous forme de vignettes pour une marque de chocolat réalisées par SKARBINO : 22 vignettes concernent les troupes du Württemberg
3 planches de S. KRICKEL :
Artillerie à cheval 1804 et bataillon léger 1805
Général de cavalerie 1806 et chasseur à cheval 1805
Tambour-major du 4ème Rgt 1811 et Garde Jäger 1807
Infographies d’ANDRE JOUINEAU dans l’ouvarge de F-G HOURTOULLE - la MOSKOWA, BORODINO, LA BATAILLE DES REDOUTES - publié chez Histoire et Collections en 2000 :
page 85 la 25ème division wurtembergeoise
page 86 cavalerie du 3ème corps du maréchal Ney
page 107 2ème division de cavalerie légère du 2ème corps de réserve
Dessins d’HERBERT KNÖTEL publiés dans l’ouvrage de JOHN R.ELTING NAPOLEONIC UNIFORMS Volume 3. Le Württemberg fait l’objet de 20 planches à partir de la page 154.

Flags and Standards

FELDZEICHEN DES KÖNIGLICH WÜRTTEMBERGISCHEN HEERES HANDBUCH DER FAHNEN UND STANDARTEN 1806 BIS 1918 de HERBERT HAHN, Stuttgart Spemann, 1985.
WUERTTEMBERG INFANTRY COLOURS 1798-1815 de JOHN COOK
Planche N°VII de BRAUER et H. KNÖTEL (série Fahnentafel) : die Württembergischen Infanterie-Fahnen 1811-1814.
Planche N° D12 de la série LE PLUMET de RIGO : Royaume du Württemberg drapeaux 1811-1814.

Règlements et documents d’archives - collection J-P PERCONTE

Règlement de décembre 1808 (communication d’un chercheur allemand spécialiste des troupes du Württemberg) :
Décret du 01/12/1808 concernant les équipages des chevaux et les casques du Royaume du Württemberg.
Décret du 07/12/1808 donnant la description des uniformes et des équipements des différents corps et grades de l’Armée württembergeoise.
Décret du 07/12/1808 donnant la description des gibernes des troupes du Royaume de Württemberg.
Dienst-Reglement für die Königlich Württembergische Infanterie Stuttgart 1810 : Règlement sur l’infanterie du 1er juillet 1810 (collection privée allemande).
Documents d’archives divers couvrant la période 1807-1815 (communication d’un chercheur allemand).
Almanachs royaux des années 1808, 1810 et 1813 (collection privée allemande)
Série de planches et de dessins : collection J-P PERCONTE
Tableaux, dessins, aquarelles, planches de J. B. SEELE (peintre contemporain) : la source iconographique de 1ère main. Certaines planches ont été publiées dans le livre de HERBERT HAHN DAS KÖNIGLICH WÜRTTEMBERGISCHE HEER 1806-1871
Série de dessins sur les troupes du Württemberg d’EDUARD VON CALLEE (collection privée allemande).
Série de dessins sur les troupes du Württemberg de VAN D. LANGENDYK (collection privée allemande)
Série " Petits soldats d’Alsace " : 14 concernent les troupes du Württemberg vers 1809 (communication de Frédéric Berjaud)
Tableau de la bataille d’Isny de juillet 1809 (collection privée allemande)
Dessin du drapeau du Land Bataillon Rotweil de 1809 (collection privée allemande)
Série de dessins de LUDWIG SCHARF (5 planches dans notre collection)
Série de dessins du Musée de l’Armée de Rastatt (3 dessins dans notre collection) et également des photos des parties d’uniforme et d’équipement conservées dans ce Musée.

Publications de J-P PERCONTE (chez l’auteur)

LES FORCES ARMEES DU WÜRTTEMBERG (1805-1813) - LA CAVALERIE 1798-1813 - LES REGIMENTS DE CHEVAU-LEGERS.
LES FORCES ARMEES DU WÜRTTEMBERG (1805-1813) - LA CAVALERIE 1798-1813 - LES REGIMENTS DE CHASSEURS A CHEVAL.
ARMEE DU WÜRTTEMBERG - REGLEMENT DE DECEMBRE 1808 - (En collaboration avec UWE EHMKE pour les recherches et FREDERIC BERJAUD pour les illustrations) :
LEIB CHEVAULEGERS REGIMENT
CHEVAULEGERS REGIMENT HERZOG HEINRICH

Histoires régimentaires

Histoire du Régiment d’infanterie N°1 et du Régiment N°6
Grenadierregiment Königin Olga (1. Württ. N°119) für 200 jähriges Bestehen... Stuttgart 1883
Histoire du Régiment d’infanterie N°5 et du Régiment N°11 de 1814-1815
Geschichte des Infanterie-Regiments Kaiser Wilhelm König von Preussen (2 Württembergishen) N°120 1673-1909 de Rudolf Menzel Stuttgart
Histoire du Régiment d’infanterie N°2 et du Régiment N°3
Geschichte des 3.Württ. Infanterie-Regiments Nr.121 1716-1891 de Hardegg, Horn et Schempp , Stuttgart 1891
Histoire du Régiment d’infanterie N°3 et du Régiment N°8 de 1814
Geschichte des 4.Wiirtt. lnfanterie-Regiments No. 122 Kaiser Franz Joseph Von Oesterreich, König Von Ungarn. De Müller, Herbert publié à Heilbronn en 1906
Histoire du Régiment d’infanterie N°8 et des 2 bataillons légers futur Régiment N°10
Geschichte des Infanterie-Regiments Kaiser Friedrich, König von Preussen (7.Württ.) Nr.125. 1809 bis 1895 de Karl Marx publié à Berlin en 1895
Histoire des chasseurs à pied (chasseurs noirs)
Der schwarze Jäger ober Würtembergs Krieger in den Jahren 1805-1816 de R.M. Felder 1839
Geschichte des Grenadier-Regiments König Karl (5.Württ.) Nr.123 de Hermann Nübling publié à Berlin en 1911.
Histoire du 2ème Régiment de cavalerie (Leib Chevau-légers Regiment)
Geschichte des Königlich württ. vierten Reiter-Regiments Königin Olga, 1805-1866.
Mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Brigade Normann im Feldzuge von 1813. de R.Starkloff publié à Stuttgart en 1867.
Histoire du 3ème Régiment de cavalerie (chasseurs à cheval Herzog Louis) -
Geschichte des Königlich Württembergischen Zweiten Reiter-Regiment de Starklof Darmstadt et Leipzig 1862
Histoire du 5ème Régiment de cavalerie (Dragons du Prince Royal)
Die ersten 100 Jahre des Ulanen-Regiments König Wilhelm 1. (2. Württemb.) Nr 20 de Gleich publié à Stuttgart en 1909.
Histoire de l’Artillerie -
Geschichte des 2. Württembergischen Feldartillerie-Regiments Nr 29 Prinzregent Luitpold von Bayern und seiner Stammtrupenteile, Stuttgart 1892
Geschichte der Königlich Württembergischen Artillerie de Strack von Weissenbach publié à Stuttgart en 1882.

The "fog of war" in the Napoleonic age

A while back reading through accounts of the Hanoverian's in the Waterloo campaign I came across some interesting examples of the 'fog of war' and I thought these were worth highlighting.

From a report by Major-General Kielmansegge of the 1st Hanoverian brigade at Quatre Bras:
The Luneburg Light Infantry Battalion was at the head of the formation and moved to the left. It received the order to drive the enemy who were advancing from Pierremont back. This was achieved with great steadiness and the hamlet was taken. The battalion would have captured two enemy cannon which had advanced on the flank, but a signal by a Brunswick bugler on our left flank, which was repeated by our own buglers and immediately obeyed, afforded the enemy sufficient time to withdraw.

Just imagine you are about to sieze the cannon and your troops halt for no apparent reason, who gave that order!!!

From a report by Lieutenant Tschirschnitz of the Bremen Light Infantry at Quatre Bras:
On the high road to Namur, around half an hour from Nivelles, the troops halted in a clover field on the right of the road. Due to the extreme heat  and the pace of the march, some of the soldiers had fallen behind, but now  they all rejoined the battalion. The order to cook the food we had taken with us was issued, but another order  to march immediately (which arrived after only half an hour of rest) meant the meat which was half cooked by this time remained, because it would have been more onerous to take it with us.

You plan ahead, your troops are well cared for and they end up with no food!


From the same report:
On the 17th June the skirmish fire began at dawn on our left towards the Duke of York Light Infantry Battalion. The 3rd Company of the Bremen Battalion was also attacked by the French, who had advanced from a nearby farm, and was ordered to rejoin the battalion. Several times the enemy tried to force our position with a vastly superior force, but each attempt was repelled and the Tirailleurs were pursued by our flankers for some 300 to 400 paces; the flankers returned safely to the battalion on each occasion. Because of the incessant musket fire our ammunition had to be replenished on several occasions, but we received rifle ammunition by mistake, which we exchanged with the English Light Infantry, but which caused considerable delay.

Actually I understand they were taken out of line for over an hour while they sorted the mess out. How often do your troops on the tabletop going inactive for no good reason or are they always available ready to obey your every command?

From the same report:
The middle of the two Hanoverian battalion was intersected by a path skirted by hedges, which led from our position to the enemy's. The 1st half of the battalions stood on the left of this path, the 2nd half on the right. Because of the incessant firing  a number of musket s became locked and would not work, and so around 11 o'clock in the morning the 1st and 2nd Companies, under the command of Major Muller, were sent back to the high road to clean their weapons.

How do your favorite rules account for this?
I often wonder how much do the rules we play with reflect this reality, people will tell me that their favorite rules 'of course take this into account' but when you ask where specifically you are given this general sweeping statement 'well its just all factored in', really, are you sure?

I am reminded of the comment made by CS Grant on rereading his fathers book 'Napoleonic Wargaming' after 30 years; 'The reader may not agree with all his deductions but the historical basis for the rules is set out in a way that is not often seen in modern rule sets'. Maybe with all the emphasis on gloss these days something is being lost.

I feel that in some ways we need to more explicitly 'factor this in', maybe with some sort of 'event' card system but then how to do it and not make the whole game seem rather more about luck instead of about the skill of the general.

Of course you could argue this somewhat depends on the 'level' of your rule set, an army/corps level rule set should not really have the level of detail that would include company or even battalion 'events', whereas it would obviously be very relevant for a skirmish game. However I would counter that most higher level rule sets I have seen do include a lot of this minor level detail or 'chrome' simply because 'we' somewhat bizarrely like to see our battalions or squadrons charge home or engage in a firefight irregardless of the level, so maybe these 'events' are needed anyway.

Food for thought...

Crag Piquet October-December 1863

Not Napoleonic's (obviously) but something a came across a while back, actually of all places on an auction site (no not that one!) in the background to some medals that were up for sale, the NorthWest Frontier! It is an interesting story worth telling and if we want a Napoleonic slant I think with a bit of imagination this would adapt into a few Sharp Practice scenarios, say French vs Spanish. You never know maybe the Perrys' will tire of the Sudan and decide to cover the Afghan wars.

The Umbeyla Campaign
In the autumn of 1863 Brigadier-General Sir Neville Chamberlain, K.C.B., formed the 5,600 strong Yusafzai Field Force, with the aim of putting an end to the raiding of the Malka Pathans, and to drive them out into the plains beyond the Chamla Valley. The Force comprised the 71st Highlanders, the 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers, the Corps of Guides, Native Cavalry, Infantry, and Guns, and which included Lieutenant Pitcher as Adjutant of the 1st Punjab Infantry, marched on the 18th October 1863, intending to advance into the Chalma Valley via the Umbeyla Pass, but great difficulty was experienced in getting the elephants of the baggage train through the defile, and after three days the entire expedition came to a stop. The Bunerwal tribe, who inhabited the area, were afraid that the British had come to annex their territory, and rallying support from neighbouring tribes, attacked the Column. Penned in, with little prospect of being able to advance directly into the Chalma Valley, Chamberlain decided to adopt a defensive position and wait for reinforcements, hoping that the passage of time and the discouragement that repeated unsuccessful attacks were likely to produce upon the enemy would weaken their numbers and break up their unnatural alliance.

The position occupied by British troops was enclosed on the left (west) by the Guru Mountain, which separates Umbeyla from Buner, and on the right (east) by a range of hills, not quite so high. The main piquet on the Guru occupied a position upon some precipitous cliffs known as the Eagle's Nest, while that on the right was designated the 'Crag piquet'. Although there was only about 800 yards between them, the valley floor lay some 1500 feet below which gives some indication of the steepness of the ascent. From below, the ridges immediately commanding the camp were plainly visible, and on these it was proposed at first to establish out-posts, but on reaching these points, it was discovered that they in their turn were dominated by strong positions further up in the hills, and it thus became necessary to push post after post, into the mountains on either hand until the process was only stopped at the Eagle’s Nest, on the left flank, and the Crag picket on the right by the impossibility of adequately relieving or supporting the troops at greater distances.

The Eagle's Nest was only large enough to accommodate 110 men, so 120 more were placed under the shelter of some rocks at its base, and the remainder of the troops told off for the defence of the left piquet were drawn up on and about a rocky knoll, 400 feet west of the Eagle's Nest.
As it was, no relief from below could reach the Crag picket in less than 45 minutes, nor the Eagle’s Nest in less than one hour from the time of leaving the camp below, and as these posts were invisible from thence, assistance when required must be sent for, which practically doubled the distance.

The Eagles Nest, 26th October
Some 2,000 of the Bunerwals occupied a breastwork on the crest of a spur of the Guru Mountain; and about noon on the 26th they moved down, and with loud shouts attacked the Eagle's Nest. Their matchlock men posted themselves to the greatest advantage in a wood, and opened a galling fire upon our defences, while their swordsmen made a determined advance. The nature of the ground prevented our guns from being brought to bear upon the assailants, and they were thus able to get across the open space in front of the piquet, and plant their standards close under its parapet. For some considerable time they remained in this position, all our efforts to dislodge them proving of no avail. Eventually, however, they were forced to give way, and were driven up the hill, leaving the ground covered with their dead, and a great many wounded, who were taken into our hospitals and carefully treated, while a still greater number were carried off by their friends. Our losses were, 2 British officers, 1 Native officer, and 26 men killed; and 2 British officers, 7 Native officers, and 86 men wounded.

First Assault on Crag Piquet, 30th October
Due to the broken nature of the ground, the key to the British defensive position on the right was a high rock hill commanding all the lower defences. The ascent to this was ‘most precipitous, the path leading to its top narrow and difficult, and where the summit is reached there is but little level ground to stand upon.’ It was known simply as “The Crag”.

On the morning of the 30th October, 1863, an attack was made by the Bunerwals, upon the advance piquets of the Right Defence, the whole of which was held by the 1st Punjab Infantry and a Company of the Guide Corps under the command of Major C.P.Keyes. Above the main piquets was the Crag. As it was necessary to occupy it, in order to command the lower piquets, Major Keyes placed a small party of 12 men in it, as many as it could hold.
About half an hour before daylight on the morning of the 30th, heavy firing commenced on the Crag, and it soon appeared that the piquet was hard pressed by the enemy. Keyes immediately detached all the men he could spare from the lower piquets in support, before he and Lieutenant Pitcher advanced with about 20 picked men to their assistance, but before they could reach the top of the Crag the small party there had been overpowered and driven off the hill. Finding the important position lost, Keyes ordered his men to take cover from the enemy’s fire beneath the overhanging rocks, about 20 paces from the summit, determined to wait until daylight should enable him to distinguish friend from foe, and for reinforcements to arrive. As the day broke, Keyes observed the 20th Punjab Native Infantry entering the main piquet below, and convinced of the danger of allowing the Crag Piquet to remain for even a short time in the enemy’s hands, he directed his men to fix bayonets and charge. Due to the nature of the approach to the top of the Crag, the attack had to be made in almost singlefile and while Keyes ascended one path, he directed Lieutenant G.V. Fosbury, late 4th European Regiment, and Lieutenant Pitcher to advance up others. Fosbury led his men ‘with the greatest coolness and intrepidity, and was the first man to gain the top of the Crag on his side of the attack.’ Meanwhile Pitcher, ‘equally cool and daring’, led his men almost to the summit, until, in the moment of victory, he was wounded by a boulder hurled by the enemy from the top. After ‘a most exciting and hand-to-hand fight’, the Crag Piquet was recovered, with the enemy driven out at the point of the bayonet, and three standards captured. With the Crag Piquet taken, the remainder of the enemy quickly disappeared down the mountain, leaving behind 54 killed and 7 wounded.
In his report of the action, Major Keyes wrote: ‘If the Victoria Cross be the award for coolness and daring courage in the presence of great danger, these two officers [Lieutenants Fosbury and Pitcher] have well earned that distinction. This is the second time within the last few days that it has been my duty to report upon the high soldier-like qualities possessed by Lieutenant H.W. Pitcher, Adjutant 1st Punjab Infantry.’ Fosbury and Pitcher did both receive the Victoria Cross, the only two given for the Umbeyla Campaign.

Second Assault on Crag Piquet, 13th November
Following the action on the 30th October, the enemy had retreated, and, apart from some minor skirmishing, there had been little subsequent fighting. The Crag Piquet had been significantly enlarged and strengthened, and was now capable of containing a garrison of 160 men. On the morning of the 13th November, Lieutenant J.P. Davidson, 1st Punjab Infantry, who was commanding the piquet, had 90 men with him, which he did not consider sufficient. Major Keyes immediately sent him up a reinforcement of 30 rifles under a Native Officer, which was all that could be spared, as a serious attack was expected on the Centre and Cliff Piquets.
Shortly after this reinforcement had arrived the men of the Crag Piquet rushed down the hill in confusion - this panic was communicated to the camp-followers, who took to flight and increased the confusion. The retreating men had a visible effect upon all, both friend and foe, and Major Keyes immediately ordered an advance to re-assure those that were wavering, and to further check the enemy until reinforcements should arrive.
Considering that his presence in the main camp was absolutely necessary to keep the men together, the cry of “Charge” was headed by Lieutenant Pitcher, accompanied by Lieutenant H.R.Young, also of the 1st Punjab Infantry. A small detachment of the Guides that were in charge of the rear defence of the main camp was brought up by Lieutenant W.J. Forlong in support; in spite of the ‘great coolness and daring’ with which they attempted the assault, they were too weak to regain the Crag Piquet, and had to fall back on the rocks below it. Lieutenant Pitcher was severely wounded in the charge, and it was not until the 101st Fusiliers were brought up into the attack that the Crag Piquet was retaken, with the enemy driven back over the hills.
In his report of the action, Major Keyes wrote: ‘I beg to bring to the special notice of the Brigadier-General Commanding the admirable manner in which he [Lieutenant Pitcher] performed this important duty; he was by many yards the foremost of his party, and the gallant bearing of this excellent young officer was the admiration of all spectators. It is impossible to say too much or to over-rate his services on this occasion. Lieutenant Pitcher was severely wounded, and was obliged to be carried back.’

The final phase, 15th December
After a month of costly defensive fighting, Lieutenant-General Sir Huge Rose, G.C.B., K.S.I., Commander-in-Chief in India, sent up from Simla two staff officers, Colonel G. Adey and Major F.S.Roberts, V.C., to assess the situation as it existed on the ground. Fortunately they agreed with Chamberlain that the tribesmen had been severely weakened in the fighting, and at length reinforcements arrived under General Gavrock, to relieve the wounded Chamberlain, who had received the last wound of his military career, whilst personally leading a later assault on Crag Piquet. An attack on the 15th December finally broke the opposition (I might cover that in a later post). Originally intended as no more than a ‘three week military promenade’, the Umbeyla Expedition had lasted three months, and cost nearly a thousand casualties.

Bibliography:
Forty-one years in India, from subaltern to commander-in-chief - F.S.Roberts
The Umbeyla Campaign - A Lecture By Captain Fosbery, V.C. April 12th, 1867